Tournament solutions by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Harrenstein, B

Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners) by Brill, M, Freeman, R, Conitzer, V

Extending tournament solutions by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Harrenstein, B

An ordinal minimax theorem by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Suksompong, W

Refining tournament solutions via margin of victory by Brill, M, Schmidt-Kraepelin, U, Suksompong, W

Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation by Brill, M, Freeman, R, Janson, S, Lackner, M

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs by Brill, M, Freeman, R, Conitzer, V, Li, Y

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks by Brill, M, Freeman, R, Conitzer, V, Shah, N

On the structure of stable tournament solutions by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Seedig, H, Suksompong, W

Minimal retentive sets in tournaments by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Fischer, F, Harrenstein, P

Pairwise diffusion of preference rankings in social networks by Brill, M, Elkind, E, Endriss, U, Grandi, U

Proportional rankings by Skowron, P, Lackner, M, Brill, M, Peters, D, Elkind, E

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting by Aziz, H, Brill, M, Conitzer, V, Elkind, E, Freeman, R, Walsh, T

Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments by Harrenstein, B, Brill, M, Lang, J, Aziz, H, Fischer, F, Seedig, H