A Biform Game Model with the Shapley Allocation Functions von Chenwei Liu, Shuwen Xiang, Yanlong Yang

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Existence and essential stability of Nash equilibria for biform games with Shapley allocation functions von Chenwei Liu, Shuwen Xiang, Yanlong Yang

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Characteristic Function of Maxmax Defensive-Equilibrium Representation for TU-Games with Strategies von Chenwei Liu, Shuwen Xiang, Yanlong Yang

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Finding the Nash equilibria of n-person noncooperative games via solving the system of equations von Huimin Li, Shuwen Xiang, Shunyou Xia, Shiguo Huang

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Privacy risk adaptive access control model via evolutionary game von Hongfa DING, Changgen PENG, Youliang TIAN, Shuwen XIANG

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Cooperative Games Based on Coalition Functions in Biform Games von Chenwei Liu, Shuwen Xiang, Yanlong Yang, Enquan Luo

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Privacy risk adaptive access control model via evolutionary game von Hongfa DING, Changgen PENG, Youliang TIAN, Shuwen XIANG

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Differential evolution particle swarm optimization algorithm based on good point set for computing Nash equilibrium of finite noncooperative game von Huimin Li, Shuwen Xiang, Yanlong Yang, Chenwei Liu

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Strongly essential set of vector Ky Fan's points problem and its applications von Dejin Zhang, Shuwen Xiang, Xicai Deng, Yanlong Yang

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Some further results on the stability of Ky Fan’s points von Shuwen Xiang, Jihao He, Chengwei Liu, Wensheng Jia, Yanlong Yang

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Hamiltonian conserved Crank-Nicolson schemes for a semi-linear wave equation based on the exponential scalar auxiliary variables approach von Huanhuan Li, Lei Kang, Meng Li, Xianbing Luo, Shuwen Xiang

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Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism Design via Shapley Value and Pareto Optimality von Xun Yang, Shuwen Xiang, Changgen Peng, Weijie Tan, Zhen Li, Ningbo Wu, Yan Zhou

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Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism with Supervised Fuzzy Shapley Value von Xun Yang, Shuwen Xiang, Changgen Peng, Weijie Tan, Yue Wang, Hai Liu, Hongfa Ding

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