Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief
ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
|
| Series: | Manuscrito |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400002&lng=en&tlng=en |
| _version_ | 1819240469243101184 |
|---|---|
| author | Fred Adams John A. Barker Murray Clarke |
| author_facet | Fred Adams John A. Barker Murray Clarke |
| author_sort | Fred Adams |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the epistemic closure thesis that correct inferences from known premises yield knowledge of the conclusions. We discuss the plausible views of Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson regarding cases of knowledge acquired via inference from false premises, and we show how our sensitivity analysis can account for such cases. We present arguments designed to discredit putative counterexamples to sensitivity analyses recently proffered by Tristan Haze, John Williams and Neil Sinhababu, which involve true statements made by untrustworthy informants and strange clocks that sometimes display the correct time while running backwards. Finally, we show that in virtue of employing the paradox-free subjunctive conditionals codified by Relevance Logic theorists instead of the paradox-laden subjunctive conditionals codified by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T14:08:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0176cc1367914bfea7487f0a5f2f0903 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2317-630X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T14:08:30Z |
| publisher | Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Manuscrito |
| spelling | doaj.art-0176cc1367914bfea7487f0a5f2f09032022-12-21T17:44:06ZengUniversidade Estadual de CampinasManuscrito2317-630X40413010.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.faS0100-60452017000400002Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True BeliefFred AdamsJohn A. BarkerMurray ClarkeABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the epistemic closure thesis that correct inferences from known premises yield knowledge of the conclusions. We discuss the plausible views of Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson regarding cases of knowledge acquired via inference from false premises, and we show how our sensitivity analysis can account for such cases. We present arguments designed to discredit putative counterexamples to sensitivity analyses recently proffered by Tristan Haze, John Williams and Neil Sinhababu, which involve true statements made by untrustworthy informants and strange clocks that sometimes display the correct time while running backwards. Finally, we show that in virtue of employing the paradox-free subjunctive conditionals codified by Relevance Logic theorists instead of the paradox-laden subjunctive conditionals codified by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400002&lng=en&tlng=enTracking theoriesDretskeNozickRelevance conditionalsFitelsonWarfieldHazeWilliamsSinhubabu |
| spellingShingle | Fred Adams John A. Barker Murray Clarke Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief Manuscrito Tracking theories Dretske Nozick Relevance conditionals Fitelson Warfield Haze Williams Sinhubabu |
| title | Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief |
| title_full | Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief |
| title_fullStr | Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief |
| title_short | Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief |
| title_sort | knowledge as fact tracking true belief |
| topic | Tracking theories Dretske Nozick Relevance conditionals Fitelson Warfield Haze Williams Sinhubabu |
| url | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400002&lng=en&tlng=en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fredadams knowledgeasfacttrackingtruebelief AT johnabarker knowledgeasfacttrackingtruebelief AT murrayclarke knowledgeasfacttrackingtruebelief |