The time between intention and action affect the experience of action

We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked w...

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Main Authors: Mikkel C. Vinding, Mads eJensen, Morten eOvergaard
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2015-06-01
Series:Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/full
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author Mikkel C. Vinding
Mads eJensen
Morten eOvergaard
Morten eOvergaard
author_facet Mikkel C. Vinding
Mads eJensen
Morten eOvergaard
Morten eOvergaard
author_sort Mikkel C. Vinding
collection DOAJ
description We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e. intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e. intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action.
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spelling doaj.art-02a52b5da5bd4f3389e20673f085fe342022-12-22T01:57:48ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience1662-51612015-06-01910.3389/fnhum.2015.00366125021The time between intention and action affect the experience of actionMikkel C. Vinding0Mads eJensen1Morten eOvergaard2Morten eOvergaard3Aarhus UniversityAarhus UniversityAarhus UniversityAalborg UniversityWe present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e. intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e. intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/fullIntentionsense of agencyMotor planningdelayed intentionsIntentional BindingDistal intention
spellingShingle Mikkel C. Vinding
Mads eJensen
Morten eOvergaard
Morten eOvergaard
The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Intention
sense of agency
Motor planning
delayed intentions
Intentional Binding
Distal intention
title The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
title_full The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
title_fullStr The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
title_full_unstemmed The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
title_short The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
title_sort time between intention and action affect the experience of action
topic Intention
sense of agency
Motor planning
delayed intentions
Intentional Binding
Distal intention
url http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/full
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