The time between intention and action affect the experience of action
We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked w...
Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2015-06-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/full |
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author | Mikkel C. Vinding Mads eJensen Morten eOvergaard Morten eOvergaard |
author_facet | Mikkel C. Vinding Mads eJensen Morten eOvergaard Morten eOvergaard |
author_sort | Mikkel C. Vinding |
collection | DOAJ |
description | We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e. intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e. intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-10T07:21:04Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-02a52b5da5bd4f3389e20673f085fe34 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1662-5161 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-10T07:21:04Z |
publishDate | 2015-06-01 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | Article |
series | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |
spelling | doaj.art-02a52b5da5bd4f3389e20673f085fe342022-12-22T01:57:48ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience1662-51612015-06-01910.3389/fnhum.2015.00366125021The time between intention and action affect the experience of actionMikkel C. Vinding0Mads eJensen1Morten eOvergaard2Morten eOvergaard3Aarhus UniversityAarhus UniversityAarhus UniversityAalborg UniversityWe present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e. intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e. intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/fullIntentionsense of agencyMotor planningdelayed intentionsIntentional BindingDistal intention |
spellingShingle | Mikkel C. Vinding Mads eJensen Morten eOvergaard Morten eOvergaard The time between intention and action affect the experience of action Frontiers in Human Neuroscience Intention sense of agency Motor planning delayed intentions Intentional Binding Distal intention |
title | The time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
title_full | The time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
title_fullStr | The time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
title_full_unstemmed | The time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
title_short | The time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
title_sort | time between intention and action affect the experience of action |
topic | Intention sense of agency Motor planning delayed intentions Intentional Binding Distal intention |
url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366/full |
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