How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.

When people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort cho...

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Main Authors: Christian Knoller, Stefan Neuß, Richard Peter
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244972
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author Christian Knoller
Stefan Neuß
Richard Peter
author_facet Christian Knoller
Stefan Neuß
Richard Peter
author_sort Christian Knoller
collection DOAJ
description When people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort choices under purely monetary incentives. When financial support is provided voluntarily by another individual, we expect recipients to exert more effort to avoid bad outcomes (level effect) and to reduce effort provision to a lesser degree as financial support becomes more generous (sensitivity effect). We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment and find some evidence for the level effect and strong evidence for the sensitivity effect. This leads to significant gains in material efficiency with expected wealth being 5.5% higher and 37.3% less volatile.
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spelling doaj.art-02c45fc500964ab39877a744b54a36f12022-12-21T19:20:04ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032021-01-01161e024497210.1371/journal.pone.0244972How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.Christian KnollerStefan NeußRichard PeterWhen people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort choices under purely monetary incentives. When financial support is provided voluntarily by another individual, we expect recipients to exert more effort to avoid bad outcomes (level effect) and to reduce effort provision to a lesser degree as financial support becomes more generous (sensitivity effect). We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment and find some evidence for the level effect and strong evidence for the sensitivity effect. This leads to significant gains in material efficiency with expected wealth being 5.5% higher and 37.3% less volatile.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244972
spellingShingle Christian Knoller
Stefan Neuß
Richard Peter
How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
PLoS ONE
title How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
title_full How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
title_fullStr How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
title_full_unstemmed How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
title_short How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
title_sort how social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244972
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