The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing?
Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, expl...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi
2023-12-01
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| Series: | Eastern Journal of European Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2023_1402_TUR.pdf |
| _version_ | 1827379276916195328 |
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| author | Oğuz A. Turhan |
| author_facet | Oğuz A. Turhan |
| author_sort | Oğuz A. Turhan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T13:11:54Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-031987916c394a06a10cb0edf2ca0f39 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2068-651X 2068-6633 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T13:11:54Z |
| publishDate | 2023-12-01 |
| publisher | Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Eastern Journal of European Studies |
| spelling | doaj.art-031987916c394a06a10cb0edf2ca0f392024-01-18T11:40:06ZengAlexandru Ioan Cuza University of IasiEastern Journal of European Studies2068-651X2068-66332023-12-01140220022010.47743/ejes-2023-0209The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? Oğuz A. Turhanhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6514-787XWhy did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war.https://ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2023_1402_TUR.pdfrussiaukraineneoclassical realisminvasionnato |
| spellingShingle | Oğuz A. Turhan The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? Eastern Journal of European Studies russia ukraine neoclassical realism invasion nato |
| title | The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? |
| title_full | The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? |
| title_fullStr | The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? |
| title_full_unstemmed | The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? |
| title_short | The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing? |
| title_sort | rationale behind the russian invasion of ukraine all or nothing |
| topic | russia ukraine neoclassical realism invasion nato |
| url | https://ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2023_1402_TUR.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT oguzaturhan therationalebehindtherussianinvasionofukraineallornothing AT oguzaturhan rationalebehindtherussianinvasionofukraineallornothing |