| Summary: | The growing prevalence of livestock as an alternative or complementary livelihood strategy has become a growing threat to wildlife and forest ecosystems in China. To achieve the dual objectives of biodiversity conservation and rural development requires cooperation and coordination from local communities. However, relatively little is known about the prevalence of these social attitudes in rural China, nor the extent to which cooperation and coordination could be leveraged for the enhanced natural resource management. In this study, we used a series of experimental games to study the propensity for cooperation in the management of common property resources among rural communities in national panda nature reserves in Gansu and Sichuan provinces. We also explored how variations in socioeconomic factors may explain differences in participants' voluntary contribution patterns. Our results show that expected cooperation among peers was a major determinant of voluntary cooperation under the provision point mechanism but not the voluntary contribution mechanism. The risk in the collective returns reduced the chance for voluntary cooperation while the private risk did not show a significant effect. Other socioeconomic factors contributed little to the voluntary cooperation behaviors. Our study suggests that alleviating uncertainty of rural resident's income could enhance collective action in endangered species conservation. A cooperative with support from the government to lower the potential risk in returns could be effective in managing the livestock number and promote sustainable livelihoods around protected areas.
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