When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma
To solve problems like climate change, every little push counts. Community energy schemes are a popular policy targeted to reduce a country’s carbon emissions but the effect they have on energy use depends on whether people can work together as a community. We often find ourselves caught in a dilemm...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2016-03-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Energy Research |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fenrg.2016.00008/full |
| _version_ | 1818351736560025600 |
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| author | Anya eSkatova Anya eSkatova Benjamin eBedwell Benjamin eKuper-Smith Benjamin eKuper-Smith |
| author_facet | Anya eSkatova Anya eSkatova Benjamin eBedwell Benjamin eKuper-Smith Benjamin eKuper-Smith |
| author_sort | Anya eSkatova |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To solve problems like climate change, every little push counts. Community energy schemes are a popular policy targeted to reduce a country’s carbon emissions but the effect they have on energy use depends on whether people can work together as a community. We often find ourselves caught in a dilemma: if others are not doing their bit, why should I? In our experiment participants (N = 118) were matched in groups of 10 to play in a collective-risk game framed as a community energy purchase scheme. They made only one decision about energy use for their virtual household a day, whilst a full round of the game lasted one week in real time. All decisions were entered via personal phone or a home computer. If in the end of the week the group exceeded a pre-paid threshold of energy use, all group members would share a fine. Each day participants received feedback about decisions of their group partners, and in some groups the feedback was manipulated as high (unfair condition) or low (fair condition) use. High average group use created individual risk for participants to be penalized in the end of the week, even if they did not use much themselves. We found that under the risk of having to pay a fine, participants stayed significantly below the fair-share threshold regardless of unfair behaviour of others. On the contrary, they significantly decreased their consumption towards the end of the game. Seeing that others are doing their bit – using a fair-share – encouraged people to take advantage of the situation: those who played against fair confederates did not follow the normative behaviour but conversely, increased their consumption over the course of the game. These opportunistic strategies were demonstrated by impulsive participants who were also low in punishment sensitivity. We discuss the findings in the light of policy research as well as literature on cooperation and prosocial behaviour. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T18:42:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-03d944c16d0d4227bed6dcca918b8d84 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-598X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T18:42:29Z |
| publishDate | 2016-03-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Energy Research |
| spelling | doaj.art-03d944c16d0d4227bed6dcca918b8d842022-12-21T23:35:10ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Energy Research2296-598X2016-03-01410.3389/fenrg.2016.00008140501When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemmaAnya eSkatova0Anya eSkatova1Benjamin eBedwell2Benjamin eKuper-Smith3Benjamin eKuper-Smith4University of WarwickUniversity of NottinghamUniversity of NottinghamUCLUniversity of NottinghamTo solve problems like climate change, every little push counts. Community energy schemes are a popular policy targeted to reduce a country’s carbon emissions but the effect they have on energy use depends on whether people can work together as a community. We often find ourselves caught in a dilemma: if others are not doing their bit, why should I? In our experiment participants (N = 118) were matched in groups of 10 to play in a collective-risk game framed as a community energy purchase scheme. They made only one decision about energy use for their virtual household a day, whilst a full round of the game lasted one week in real time. All decisions were entered via personal phone or a home computer. If in the end of the week the group exceeded a pre-paid threshold of energy use, all group members would share a fine. Each day participants received feedback about decisions of their group partners, and in some groups the feedback was manipulated as high (unfair condition) or low (fair condition) use. High average group use created individual risk for participants to be penalized in the end of the week, even if they did not use much themselves. We found that under the risk of having to pay a fine, participants stayed significantly below the fair-share threshold regardless of unfair behaviour of others. On the contrary, they significantly decreased their consumption towards the end of the game. Seeing that others are doing their bit – using a fair-share – encouraged people to take advantage of the situation: those who played against fair confederates did not follow the normative behaviour but conversely, increased their consumption over the course of the game. These opportunistic strategies were demonstrated by impulsive participants who were also low in punishment sensitivity. We discuss the findings in the light of policy research as well as literature on cooperation and prosocial behaviour.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fenrg.2016.00008/fullimpulsivitycooperationPunishment sensitivitypublic goodCollective-risk social dilemmaCommunity energy |
| spellingShingle | Anya eSkatova Anya eSkatova Benjamin eBedwell Benjamin eKuper-Smith Benjamin eKuper-Smith When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma Frontiers in Energy Research impulsivity cooperation Punishment sensitivity public good Collective-risk social dilemma Community energy |
| title | When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma |
| title_full | When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma |
| title_fullStr | When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma |
| title_full_unstemmed | When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma |
| title_short | When push comes to shove: Compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective-risk household energy dilemma |
| title_sort | when push comes to shove compensating and opportunistic strategies in a collective risk household energy dilemma |
| topic | impulsivity cooperation Punishment sensitivity public good Collective-risk social dilemma Community energy |
| url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fenrg.2016.00008/full |
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