Perceptual experience and epistemic support

In this paper we analyze the problem of how our perceptual experiences give epistemic support to our beliefs. We begin with some considerations formulated by Fodor, but revise them in some respects. We consider, in particular, his recent proposal for the existence of non-conceptual representations i...

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Main Authors: José Luís Falguera, Santiago Peleteiro
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Universidad Complutense de Madrid 2014-12-01
Series:Revista de Filosofia
Subjects:
Online Access:http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/47302
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author José Luís Falguera
Santiago Peleteiro
author_facet José Luís Falguera
Santiago Peleteiro
author_sort José Luís Falguera
collection DOAJ
description In this paper we analyze the problem of how our perceptual experiences give epistemic support to our beliefs. We begin with some considerations formulated by Fodor, but revise them in some respects. We consider, in particular, his recent proposal for the existence of non-conceptual representations in perceptual information processing. Our aim is to vindicate, against the arguments raised by some representatives of so-called ‘perceptual conceptualism’, a normative role for perceptual experiences insofar as they are conceived as representations with non-conceptual content.
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spelling doaj.art-05647d3b5cd1446081104b99d23cfd312022-12-21T18:15:59ZdeuUniversidad Complutense de MadridRevista de Filosofia0034-82441988-284X2014-12-0139273210.5209/rev_RESF.2014.v39.n2.4730245417Perceptual experience and epistemic supportJosé Luís Falguera0Santiago Peleteiro1Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía Moral Universidad de Santiago de CompostelaUniversidad de Santiago de CompostelaIn this paper we analyze the problem of how our perceptual experiences give epistemic support to our beliefs. We begin with some considerations formulated by Fodor, but revise them in some respects. We consider, in particular, his recent proposal for the existence of non-conceptual representations in perceptual information processing. Our aim is to vindicate, against the arguments raised by some representatives of so-called ‘perceptual conceptualism’, a normative role for perceptual experiences insofar as they are conceived as representations with non-conceptual content.http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/47302experiencia perceptualrepresentación icónicacontenido noconceptualjustificaciónlegitimación epistémicasustento epistémico.
spellingShingle José Luís Falguera
Santiago Peleteiro
Perceptual experience and epistemic support
Revista de Filosofia
experiencia perceptual
representación icónica
contenido noconceptual
justificación
legitimación epistémica
sustento epistémico.
title Perceptual experience and epistemic support
title_full Perceptual experience and epistemic support
title_fullStr Perceptual experience and epistemic support
title_full_unstemmed Perceptual experience and epistemic support
title_short Perceptual experience and epistemic support
title_sort perceptual experience and epistemic support
topic experiencia perceptual
representación icónica
contenido noconceptual
justificación
legitimación epistémica
sustento epistémico.
url http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/47302
work_keys_str_mv AT joseluisfalguera perceptualexperienceandepistemicsupport
AT santiagopeleteiro perceptualexperienceandepistemicsupport