Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Summary: Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak the...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2021-08-01
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| Series: | iScience |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221008129 |
| _version_ | 1818681804908920832 |
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| author | Weiwei Sun Linjie Liu Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Vítor V. Vasconcelos |
| author_facet | Weiwei Sun Linjie Liu Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Vítor V. Vasconcelos |
| author_sort | Weiwei Sun |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Summary: Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population toward a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-17T10:08:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-05dfa208d5e14754b64e47f8bb4cca01 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2589-0042 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-17T10:08:47Z |
| publishDate | 2021-08-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | iScience |
| spelling | doaj.art-05dfa208d5e14754b64e47f8bb4cca012022-12-21T21:53:06ZengElsevieriScience2589-00422021-08-01248102844Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commonsWeiwei Sun0Linjie Liu1Xiaojie Chen2Attila Szolnoki3Vítor V. Vasconcelos4School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, ChinaSchool of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, ChinaSchool of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China; Corresponding authorInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, Budapest 1525, HungaryInformatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, 1012 GC Amsterdam, The NetherlandsSummary: Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population toward a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221008129Global changeNature conservationSocial sciencesDecision science |
| spellingShingle | Weiwei Sun Linjie Liu Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Vítor V. Vasconcelos Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons iScience Global change Nature conservation Social sciences Decision science |
| title | Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| title_full | Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| title_fullStr | Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| title_full_unstemmed | Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| title_short | Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| title_sort | combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons |
| topic | Global change Nature conservation Social sciences Decision science |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221008129 |
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