Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Summary: Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak the...
Main Authors: | Weiwei Sun, Linjie Liu, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Vítor V. Vasconcelos |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2021-08-01
|
Series: | iScience |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221008129 |
Similar Items
-
Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game.
by: Xiaojie Chen, et al.
Published: (2018-07-01) -
Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
by: Linjie Liu, et al.
Published: (2023-05-01) -
Evolution of cooperation driven by sampling reward
by: Jiafeng Xiao, et al.
Published: (2023-01-01) -
Biased perceptions explain collective action deadlocks and suggest new mechanisms to prompt cooperation
by: Fernando P. Santos, et al.
Published: (2021-04-01) -
Evolution of Public Cooperation in a Risky Society with Heterogeneous Assets
by: Linjie Liu, et al.
Published: (2018-01-01)