Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is
In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2014-02-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3899 |
| Summary: | In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments. |
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| ISSN: | 0824-2577 0824-2577 |