Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic
In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2018-08-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58639 |
| _version_ | 1811330939415953408 |
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| author | Nicolás Lo Guercio Damian Szmuc |
| author_facet | Nicolás Lo Guercio Damian Szmuc |
| author_sort | Nicolás Lo Guercio |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T16:11:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-06d4e2f00f0346dc91de196c463cb4a2 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T16:11:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018-08-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj.art-06d4e2f00f0346dc91de196c463cb4a22022-12-22T02:40:13ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112018-08-0122115317010.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p15329444Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency LogicNicolás Lo Guercio0Damian Szmuc1IIF-SADAF, CONICET.IIF-SADAF, CONICETIn a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58639Logics of Formal InconsistencyEpistemic justificationEvidence |
| spellingShingle | Nicolás Lo Guercio Damian Szmuc Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Logics of Formal Inconsistency Epistemic justification Evidence |
| title | Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic |
| title_full | Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic |
| title_fullStr | Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic |
| title_full_unstemmed | Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic |
| title_short | Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistency Logic |
| title_sort | remarks on the epistemic interpretation of paraconsistency logic |
| topic | Logics of Formal Inconsistency Epistemic justification Evidence |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58639 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nicolasloguercio remarksontheepistemicinterpretationofparaconsistencylogic AT damianszmuc remarksontheepistemicinterpretationofparaconsistencylogic |