Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China

The traditional political economy account of global climate change governance directs our attention to fundamental collective action problems associated with global public goods provision, resulting from positive or negative externalities as well as freeriding. The governance architecture of the 199...

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Main Authors: Thomas Bernauer, Liang Dong, Liam F. McGrath, Irina Shaymerdenova, Haibin Zhang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cogitatio 2016-09-01
Series:Politics and Governance
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/650
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author Thomas Bernauer
Liang Dong
Liam F. McGrath
Irina Shaymerdenova
Haibin Zhang
author_facet Thomas Bernauer
Liang Dong
Liam F. McGrath
Irina Shaymerdenova
Haibin Zhang
author_sort Thomas Bernauer
collection DOAJ
description The traditional political economy account of global climate change governance directs our attention to fundamental collective action problems associated with global public goods provision, resulting from positive or negative externalities as well as freeriding. The governance architecture of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol uses the traditional approaches of international diplomacy for addressing such challenges: legally binding commitments based on principles of reciprocity and (fair) cost/burden sharing via formalized carbon-budgeting. Yet, the 2015 Paris Agreement has essentially abandoned this approach, as it now operates on the basis of internationally coordinated and monitored unilateralism. On the presumption that public opinion matters for government policy, we examine how citizens view this shift in climate policy from reciprocity to unilateralism, after many years of exposure to strong reciprocity rhetoric by governments and stakeholders. To that end, we fielded a survey experiment in China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter. The results show that there is, perhaps surprisingly, strong and robust public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal climate policy. To the extent China is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus costly GHG reduction policies, our results suggest that China can leverage segments of public support in order to overcome domestic obstacles to GHG mitigation policies.
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spelling doaj.art-06f75e6b1f32458eb85fcef0be352feb2022-12-22T01:38:51ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632016-09-014315217110.17645/pag.v4i3.650375Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from ChinaThomas Bernauer0Liang Dong1Liam F. McGrath2Irina Shaymerdenova3Haibin Zhang4ETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies, SwitzerlandChina Foreign Affairs University, Institute of Asian Studies, ChinaETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies, SwitzerlandETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies, SwitzerlandPeking University, School of International Studies, ChinaThe traditional political economy account of global climate change governance directs our attention to fundamental collective action problems associated with global public goods provision, resulting from positive or negative externalities as well as freeriding. The governance architecture of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol uses the traditional approaches of international diplomacy for addressing such challenges: legally binding commitments based on principles of reciprocity and (fair) cost/burden sharing via formalized carbon-budgeting. Yet, the 2015 Paris Agreement has essentially abandoned this approach, as it now operates on the basis of internationally coordinated and monitored unilateralism. On the presumption that public opinion matters for government policy, we examine how citizens view this shift in climate policy from reciprocity to unilateralism, after many years of exposure to strong reciprocity rhetoric by governments and stakeholders. To that end, we fielded a survey experiment in China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter. The results show that there is, perhaps surprisingly, strong and robust public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal climate policy. To the extent China is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus costly GHG reduction policies, our results suggest that China can leverage segments of public support in order to overcome domestic obstacles to GHG mitigation policies.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/650Chinaclimate policyreciprocityunilateralism
spellingShingle Thomas Bernauer
Liang Dong
Liam F. McGrath
Irina Shaymerdenova
Haibin Zhang
Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
Politics and Governance
China
climate policy
reciprocity
unilateralism
title Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
title_full Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
title_fullStr Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
title_full_unstemmed Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
title_short Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China
title_sort unilateral or reciprocal climate policy experimental evidence from china
topic China
climate policy
reciprocity
unilateralism
url https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/650
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AT liamfmcgrath unilateralorreciprocalclimatepolicyexperimentalevidencefromchina
AT irinashaymerdenova unilateralorreciprocalclimatepolicyexperimentalevidencefromchina
AT haibinzhang unilateralorreciprocalclimatepolicyexperimentalevidencefromchina