Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input
Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2020-08-01
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| Series: | Applied Sciences |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/16/5429 |
| _version_ | 1797560017086316544 |
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| author | Ran Liu Bisheng Du Wenwen Yuan Guiping Li |
| author_facet | Ran Liu Bisheng Du Wenwen Yuan Guiping Li |
| author_sort | Ran Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T17:54:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-07b203ce081f4fa8a761a1469d4ca16a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2076-3417 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T17:54:29Z |
| publishDate | 2020-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Applied Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-07b203ce081f4fa8a761a1469d4ca16a2023-11-20T09:14:39ZengMDPI AGApplied Sciences2076-34172020-08-011016542910.3390/app10165429Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation InputRan Liu0Bisheng Du1Wenwen Yuan2Guiping Li3School of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, ChinaSchool of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, ChinaSchool of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, ChinaSchool of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, ChinaIncreasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/16/5429remanufacturingcompeting reverse channelssustainable innovationStackelberg game |
| spellingShingle | Ran Liu Bisheng Du Wenwen Yuan Guiping Li Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input Applied Sciences remanufacturing competing reverse channels sustainable innovation Stackelberg game |
| title | Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input |
| title_full | Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input |
| title_fullStr | Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input |
| title_short | Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input |
| title_sort | competing reverse channels performance with sustainable recycle innovation input |
| topic | remanufacturing competing reverse channels sustainable innovation Stackelberg game |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/16/5429 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ranliu competingreversechannelsperformancewithsustainablerecycleinnovationinput AT bishengdu competingreversechannelsperformancewithsustainablerecycleinnovationinput AT wenwenyuan competingreversechannelsperformancewithsustainablerecycleinnovationinput AT guipingli competingreversechannelsperformancewithsustainablerecycleinnovationinput |