The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the othe...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Leonard F.S. Wang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad Alberto Hurtado 2011-11-01
Series:Journal of Technology Management & Innovation
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/826
_version_ 1797848351784304640
author Arijit Mukherjee
Leonard F.S. Wang
author_facet Arijit Mukherjee
Leonard F.S. Wang
author_sort Arijit Mukherjee
collection DOAJ
description In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.
first_indexed 2024-04-09T18:26:07Z
format Article
id doaj.art-0842150afb5e4deaac065b5e8cb23561
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 0718-2724
language English
last_indexed 2024-04-09T18:26:07Z
publishDate 2011-11-01
publisher Universidad Alberto Hurtado
record_format Article
series Journal of Technology Management & Innovation
spelling doaj.art-0842150afb5e4deaac065b5e8cb235612023-04-11T20:02:09ZengUniversidad Alberto HurtadoJournal of Technology Management & Innovation0718-27242011-11-016410.4067/S0718-27242011000400006657The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D TournamentArijit Mukherjee0Leonard F.S. Wang1University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK, and CESifo, GermanyDepartment of Applied Economics, National University of KaohsiungIn a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/826R&D tournamentExcessive entryInsufficient entry
spellingShingle Arijit Mukherjee
Leonard F.S. Wang
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation
R&D tournament
Excessive entry
Insufficient entry
title The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_full The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_fullStr The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_full_unstemmed The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_short The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_sort winner curse and social inefficiency double whammy of r d tournament
topic R&D tournament
Excessive entry
Insufficient entry
url https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/826
work_keys_str_mv AT arijitmukherjee thewinnercurseandsocialinefficiencydoublewhammyofrdtournament
AT leonardfswang thewinnercurseandsocialinefficiencydoublewhammyofrdtournament
AT arijitmukherjee winnercurseandsocialinefficiencydoublewhammyofrdtournament
AT leonardfswang winnercurseandsocialinefficiencydoublewhammyofrdtournament