Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games

We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where <i>n</i> players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargainin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Anna Rettieva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-09-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/9/1485
Description
Summary:We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where <i>n</i> players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargaining scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games. To stabilize the multicriteria cooperative solution a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is constructed. The conditions for rational behavior, namely irrational-behavior-proofness condition and each step rational behavior condition are defined for dynamic multicriteria games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with many players is investigated.
ISSN:2227-7390