Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games

We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where <i>n</i> players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargainin...

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Main Author: Anna Rettieva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-09-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/9/1485
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author Anna Rettieva
author_facet Anna Rettieva
author_sort Anna Rettieva
collection DOAJ
description We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where <i>n</i> players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargaining scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games. To stabilize the multicriteria cooperative solution a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is constructed. The conditions for rational behavior, namely irrational-behavior-proofness condition and each step rational behavior condition are defined for dynamic multicriteria games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with many players is investigated.
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spelling doaj.art-08e78fb971774ad3847a5daceec50ee92023-11-20T12:19:42ZengMDPI AGMathematics2227-73902020-09-0189148510.3390/math8091485Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria GamesAnna Rettieva0School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, ChinaWe consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where <i>n</i> players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargaining scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games. To stabilize the multicriteria cooperative solution a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is constructed. The conditions for rational behavior, namely irrational-behavior-proofness condition and each step rational behavior condition are defined for dynamic multicriteria games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with many players is investigated.https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/9/1485dynamic gamesmulticriteria gamesNash bargaining solutiondynamic stabilityrational behavior conditions
spellingShingle Anna Rettieva
Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
Mathematics
dynamic games
multicriteria games
Nash bargaining solution
dynamic stability
rational behavior conditions
title Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
title_full Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
title_fullStr Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
title_full_unstemmed Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
title_short Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
title_sort rational behavior in dynamic multicriteria games
topic dynamic games
multicriteria games
Nash bargaining solution
dynamic stability
rational behavior conditions
url https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/9/1485
work_keys_str_mv AT annarettieva rationalbehaviorindynamicmulticriteriagames