Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization
The secure operation of smart grids is closely linked to state estimates that accurately reflect the physical characteristics of the grid. However, well-designed false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can manipulate the process of state estimation by injecting malicious data into the measurement data...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-02-01
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| Series: | Sensors |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/3/1683 |
| _version_ | 1797623094197616640 |
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| author | Pengfei Hu Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Minghui Wu Feng Hua Lina Qiao |
| author_facet | Pengfei Hu Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Minghui Wu Feng Hua Lina Qiao |
| author_sort | Pengfei Hu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The secure operation of smart grids is closely linked to state estimates that accurately reflect the physical characteristics of the grid. However, well-designed false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can manipulate the process of state estimation by injecting malicious data into the measurement data while bypassing the detection of the security system, ultimately causing the results of state estimation to deviate from secure values. Since FDIAs tampering with the measurement data of some buses will lead to error offset, this paper proposes an attack-detection algorithm based on statistical learning according to the different characteristic parameters of measurement error before and after tampering. In order to detect and classify false data from the measurement data, in this paper, we report the model establishment and estimation of error parameters for the tampered measurement data by combining the the k-means++ algorithm with the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm. At the same time, we located and recorded the bus that the attacker attempted to tamper with. In order to verify the feasibility of the algorithm proposed in this paper, the IEEE 5-bus standard test system and the IEEE 14-bus standard test system were used for simulation analysis. Numerical examples demonstrate that the combined use of the two algorithms can decrease the detection time to less than 0.011883 s and correctly locate the false data with a probability of more than 95%. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T09:23:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0a8f7b695f7742f5a818efd877a8731b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T09:23:47Z |
| publishDate | 2023-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-0a8f7b695f7742f5a818efd877a8731b2023-11-16T18:04:40ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202023-02-01233168310.3390/s23031683Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation MaximizationPengfei Hu0Wengen Gao1Yunfei Li2Minghui Wu3Feng Hua4Lina Qiao5School of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, ChinaThe secure operation of smart grids is closely linked to state estimates that accurately reflect the physical characteristics of the grid. However, well-designed false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can manipulate the process of state estimation by injecting malicious data into the measurement data while bypassing the detection of the security system, ultimately causing the results of state estimation to deviate from secure values. Since FDIAs tampering with the measurement data of some buses will lead to error offset, this paper proposes an attack-detection algorithm based on statistical learning according to the different characteristic parameters of measurement error before and after tampering. In order to detect and classify false data from the measurement data, in this paper, we report the model establishment and estimation of error parameters for the tampered measurement data by combining the the k-means++ algorithm with the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm. At the same time, we located and recorded the bus that the attacker attempted to tamper with. In order to verify the feasibility of the algorithm proposed in this paper, the IEEE 5-bus standard test system and the IEEE 14-bus standard test system were used for simulation analysis. Numerical examples demonstrate that the combined use of the two algorithms can decrease the detection time to less than 0.011883 s and correctly locate the false data with a probability of more than 95%.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/3/1683false data injection attacksstatistical learning methodsattack detectionattack locationsmart grid |
| spellingShingle | Pengfei Hu Wengen Gao Yunfei Li Minghui Wu Feng Hua Lina Qiao Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization Sensors false data injection attacks statistical learning methods attack detection attack location smart grid |
| title | Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization |
| title_full | Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization |
| title_fullStr | Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization |
| title_full_unstemmed | Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization |
| title_short | Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids Based on Expectation Maximization |
| title_sort | detection of false data injection attacks in smart grids based on expectation maximization |
| topic | false data injection attacks statistical learning methods attack detection attack location smart grid |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/3/1683 |
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