Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta

Jensen (1986) said that the agency problem can be minimized by reducing the free cash flows in a company. These free cash flows can be reduced by increasing the debt or by increasing the dividend. This theory was developed in the United State of America in which most of the listed companies have a d...

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Main Author: Zaenal Arifin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universitas Islam Indonesia 2009-08-01
Series:Jurnal Siasat Bisnis
Online Access:https://jurnal.uii.ac.id/JSB/article/view/1018
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author Zaenal Arifin
author_facet Zaenal Arifin
author_sort Zaenal Arifin
collection DOAJ
description Jensen (1986) said that the agency problem can be minimized by reducing the free cash flows in a company. These free cash flows can be reduced by increasing the debt or by increasing the dividend. This theory was developed in the United State of America in which most of the listed companies have a dispersed ownership structure. It is interesting to evaluate the effectiveness of this bonding mechanism for the listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in which most of them have a concentrated ownership structure. The purpose of this research is to examine the effectiveness of this bonding mechanism. By investigating the same sample of listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1996 and in 2000, this research discovers that in 1996, the debt bonding mechanism is not effective to reduce an agency problem but it increases the agency problem instead. In 2000, the debt bonding mechanism is still not effective but it does not increase the agency problem anymore. Meanwhile, the dividend bonding mechanism is effective to reduce the agency problem both in 1996 and in 2000. However, the dividend bonding mechanism is avoided by the companies that have a family ownership that closed to a minimum portion of majority or domination. Kata Kunci: Agency Problem, Bonding, Hutang, Dividen, Kepemilikan Keluarga
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spelling doaj.art-0bf82fa8c5184744b5eda64518744b322022-12-22T02:32:26ZengUniversitas Islam IndonesiaJurnal Siasat Bisnis0853-76662528-70012009-08-0118Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek JakartaZaenal ArifinJensen (1986) said that the agency problem can be minimized by reducing the free cash flows in a company. These free cash flows can be reduced by increasing the debt or by increasing the dividend. This theory was developed in the United State of America in which most of the listed companies have a dispersed ownership structure. It is interesting to evaluate the effectiveness of this bonding mechanism for the listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in which most of them have a concentrated ownership structure. The purpose of this research is to examine the effectiveness of this bonding mechanism. By investigating the same sample of listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1996 and in 2000, this research discovers that in 1996, the debt bonding mechanism is not effective to reduce an agency problem but it increases the agency problem instead. In 2000, the debt bonding mechanism is still not effective but it does not increase the agency problem anymore. Meanwhile, the dividend bonding mechanism is effective to reduce the agency problem both in 1996 and in 2000. However, the dividend bonding mechanism is avoided by the companies that have a family ownership that closed to a minimum portion of majority or domination. Kata Kunci: Agency Problem, Bonding, Hutang, Dividen, Kepemilikan Keluarga https://jurnal.uii.ac.id/JSB/article/view/1018
spellingShingle Zaenal Arifin
Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
Jurnal Siasat Bisnis
title Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
title_full Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
title_fullStr Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
title_full_unstemmed Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
title_short Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
title_sort efektifitas mekanisme bonding dividen dan hutang untuk mengurangi masalah agensi pada perusahaan di bursa efek jakarta
url https://jurnal.uii.ac.id/JSB/article/view/1018
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