Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain
Government subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retai...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-07-01
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| Series: | Systems |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/7/378 |
| _version_ | 1797587360045596672 |
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| author | Yujie Gu Menghao Xue Mingxuan Zhao Yufu Long |
| author_facet | Yujie Gu Menghao Xue Mingxuan Zhao Yufu Long |
| author_sort | Yujie Gu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Government subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, from the economic, environmental, and social perspectives. Based on game analysis technology, different Stackelberg game models among the government and the CLSC members are formulated to analyze the optimal decisions under different power structures. By conducting theoretic comparative and sensitivity analyses and a case study, the effects of the government subsidy and the power structure are explored from the total profit, environmental benefit, and social welfare. Results show that the subsidy is good for sustainable development of the CLSC, which improves the total profit of the CLSC members, environmental benefit, and social welfare and the improvement effect is more prominent when the CLSC members have unequal bargaining power. Moreover, according to the growth proportion of profit, the retailer and collector benefit more from the subsidy among the CLSC members when they have different bargaining power, otherwise, the CLSC members benefit equally from the subsidy, and the subsidy is more beneficial to the environment compared with the total supply chain profit and social welfare. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T00:35:50Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0c89f57686eb467587847412d8bc148d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2079-8954 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T00:35:50Z |
| publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-0c89f57686eb467587847412d8bc148d2023-11-18T21:36:22ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542023-07-0111737810.3390/systems11070378Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply ChainYujie Gu0Menghao Xue1Mingxuan Zhao2Yufu Long3The Research Center of Energy Economy, School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454150, ChinaThe Research Center of Energy Economy, School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454150, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, ChinaThe Research Center of Energy Economy, School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454150, ChinaGovernment subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, from the economic, environmental, and social perspectives. Based on game analysis technology, different Stackelberg game models among the government and the CLSC members are formulated to analyze the optimal decisions under different power structures. By conducting theoretic comparative and sensitivity analyses and a case study, the effects of the government subsidy and the power structure are explored from the total profit, environmental benefit, and social welfare. Results show that the subsidy is good for sustainable development of the CLSC, which improves the total profit of the CLSC members, environmental benefit, and social welfare and the improvement effect is more prominent when the CLSC members have unequal bargaining power. Moreover, according to the growth proportion of profit, the retailer and collector benefit more from the subsidy among the CLSC members when they have different bargaining power, otherwise, the CLSC members benefit equally from the subsidy, and the subsidy is more beneficial to the environment compared with the total supply chain profit and social welfare.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/7/378closed-loop supply chaingovernment subsidysustainable developmentpower structure |
| spellingShingle | Yujie Gu Menghao Xue Mingxuan Zhao Yufu Long Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Systems closed-loop supply chain government subsidy sustainable development power structure |
| title | Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
| title_full | Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
| title_short | Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
| title_sort | optimal government subsidy decision and its impact on sustainable development of a closed loop supply chain |
| topic | closed-loop supply chain government subsidy sustainable development power structure |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/11/7/378 |
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