Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge
There is a famous idea in modal epistemology according to which conceivability of a proposition is a good guide for its possibility. Yablo (1993) persents a model for justification of modal beliefs, based on which Conceivability of a proposition is evidence for its possibility. Van Inwagen (1998) be...
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| Format: | Article |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2018-06-01
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| Series: | حکمت و فلسفه |
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| Online Access: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9162_ea8d8bdfccf59657aca31ca494e12560.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797387436871909376 |
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| author | Masoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour |
| author_facet | Masoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour |
| author_sort | Masoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There is a famous idea in modal epistemology according to which conceivability of a proposition is a good guide for its possibility. Yablo (1993) persents a model for justification of modal beliefs, based on which Conceivability of a proposition is evidence for its possibility. Van Inwagen (1998) believes that if we accept Yablo’s model, we have to accept modal skepticism. To argue for this, Van Inwagen examines the modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists on Yablo’s model. Van Inwagen claims that this proposition is undecidable on Yablo’s model. So we cannot have a justified belief that it is possible that transparent iron exists. If van Inwagen’s claim about the modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists is correct, Yablo’s model, one might think, faces a serious problem. For if we generalize van Inwagen’s analysis of the proposition that transparent iron exists, we have to count intuitively possible propositions, propositions the modal status of which can be intuitively known as possible, as undecidable. But it is quite plausible that our beliefs about the possibility of some intuitively possible propositions are justified, so these propositions are not undecidable. I will, however, argue that van Inwagen’s analysis of modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists cannot be generalized to all (or most) intuitively possible propositions. And therefore it is possible to accept at the same time both Yablo’s justification model and van Inwagen’s analysis about the modal status of propositions like transparent iron exist. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:25:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0d185236800f4cce88b6dc4c6225c148 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1735-3238 2476-6038 |
| language | fas |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:25:04Z |
| publishDate | 2018-06-01 |
| publisher | Allameh Tabataba'i University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | حکمت و فلسفه |
| spelling | doaj.art-0d185236800f4cce88b6dc4c6225c1482023-12-18T10:46:05ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressحکمت و فلسفه1735-32382476-60382018-06-01145473410.22054/wph.2018.91629162Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledgeMasoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour0 Researcher in Philosophy at Danesh-haye Bonyadeen Research Institute, Tehran, IranThere is a famous idea in modal epistemology according to which conceivability of a proposition is a good guide for its possibility. Yablo (1993) persents a model for justification of modal beliefs, based on which Conceivability of a proposition is evidence for its possibility. Van Inwagen (1998) believes that if we accept Yablo’s model, we have to accept modal skepticism. To argue for this, Van Inwagen examines the modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists on Yablo’s model. Van Inwagen claims that this proposition is undecidable on Yablo’s model. So we cannot have a justified belief that it is possible that transparent iron exists. If van Inwagen’s claim about the modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists is correct, Yablo’s model, one might think, faces a serious problem. For if we generalize van Inwagen’s analysis of the proposition that transparent iron exists, we have to count intuitively possible propositions, propositions the modal status of which can be intuitively known as possible, as undecidable. But it is quite plausible that our beliefs about the possibility of some intuitively possible propositions are justified, so these propositions are not undecidable. I will, however, argue that van Inwagen’s analysis of modal status of the proposition that transparent iron exists cannot be generalized to all (or most) intuitively possible propositions. And therefore it is possible to accept at the same time both Yablo’s justification model and van Inwagen’s analysis about the modal status of propositions like transparent iron exist.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9162_ea8d8bdfccf59657aca31ca494e12560.pdfmodal epistemologypossibilityvan inwagen's modal skepticismconceivabilityundecidability |
| spellingShingle | Masoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge حکمت و فلسفه modal epistemology possibility van inwagen's modal skepticism conceivability undecidability |
| title | Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge |
| title_full | Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge |
| title_short | Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism and The Scope of Modal knowledge |
| title_sort | van inwagen s modal skepticism and the scope of modal knowledge |
| topic | modal epistemology possibility van inwagen's modal skepticism conceivability undecidability |
| url | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9162_ea8d8bdfccf59657aca31ca494e12560.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT masoudziaalinasabpour vaninwagensmodalskepticismandthescopeofmodalknowledge |