The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision
The main research question asked in this paper is whether and when a dual-channel retailer (retailer in short) should adopt the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) strategy. To answer this question, we first derive the optimal price decision using the non-BOPS and BOPS strategies. Subsequently,...
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Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2021-11-01
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Series: | Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research |
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/0718-1876/16/7/173 |
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author | Peng Zhang Bei Xia Victor Shi |
author_facet | Peng Zhang Bei Xia Victor Shi |
author_sort | Peng Zhang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The main research question asked in this paper is whether and when a dual-channel retailer (retailer in short) should adopt the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) strategy. To answer this question, we first derive the optimal price decision using the non-BOPS and BOPS strategies. Subsequently, we compare the performance of retailers under non-BOPS and BOPS scenarios. Our main findings are that under the monopoly scenario, retailers may not always benefit from the BOPS strategy. Retailers will benefit only if the offline operational costs are low and the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is high. However, the BOPS strategy cannot improve dual-channel retailers’ market share. Furthermore, under a Stackelberg game scenario with e-retailers as leaders, when the value of a product is medium and the transaction costs of the offline channel are high, retailers can use the BOPS strategy to enhance their market share. If the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is also high, retailers can further improve their profits by using the BOPS strategy. Overall, these findings not only provide decision support for retailers, but also enrich the theories on dual-channel retailing in operations management. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-10T03:44:33Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-0d680bd764d343cea26880ba3442d10d |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0718-1876 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-10T03:44:33Z |
publishDate | 2021-11-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
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series | Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research |
spelling | doaj.art-0d680bd764d343cea26880ba3442d10d2023-11-23T09:09:41ZengMDPI AGJournal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research0718-18762021-11-011673184320110.3390/jtaer16070173The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy DecisionPeng Zhang0Bei Xia1Victor Shi2Business School, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225127, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Taizhou University, Taizhou 225300, ChinaLazaridis School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, CanadaThe main research question asked in this paper is whether and when a dual-channel retailer (retailer in short) should adopt the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) strategy. To answer this question, we first derive the optimal price decision using the non-BOPS and BOPS strategies. Subsequently, we compare the performance of retailers under non-BOPS and BOPS scenarios. Our main findings are that under the monopoly scenario, retailers may not always benefit from the BOPS strategy. Retailers will benefit only if the offline operational costs are low and the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is high. However, the BOPS strategy cannot improve dual-channel retailers’ market share. Furthermore, under a Stackelberg game scenario with e-retailers as leaders, when the value of a product is medium and the transaction costs of the offline channel are high, retailers can use the BOPS strategy to enhance their market share. If the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is also high, retailers can further improve their profits by using the BOPS strategy. Overall, these findings not only provide decision support for retailers, but also enrich the theories on dual-channel retailing in operations management.https://www.mdpi.com/0718-1876/16/7/173retailingdual channelsynergy strategyStackelberg game |
spellingShingle | Peng Zhang Bei Xia Victor Shi The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research retailing dual channel synergy strategy Stackelberg game |
title | The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision |
title_full | The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision |
title_fullStr | The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision |
title_full_unstemmed | The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision |
title_short | The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision |
title_sort | dual channel retailer s channel synergy strategy decision |
topic | retailing dual channel synergy strategy Stackelberg game |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/0718-1876/16/7/173 |
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