Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity

The unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fai...

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Main Authors: Liuyang Ji, Wenyao Liu, Yifan Zhang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2021-12-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.796295/full
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author Liuyang Ji
Wenyao Liu
Yifan Zhang
author_facet Liuyang Ji
Wenyao Liu
Yifan Zhang
author_sort Liuyang Ji
collection DOAJ
description The unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, which will lead to the complex effect of the traditional mechanism to regulate workers’ safety behavior. In order to improve the effectiveness of incentive measures for worker safety behavior, this paper takes into account the multiple differences of individual workers’ fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, based on the tournament mechanism to construct a competition incentive model. By designing a tournament reward and salary distribution for heterogeneous workers, the occurrence of unsafe behaviors can be reduced. The study found that in terms of the optimal level of safety investment, workers with risk aversion attitude generally invest higher than that of workers with risk preference, no matter whether they have a strong fairness preference or not; In terms of the distribution of tournament rewards, workers with a risk aversion attitude and a higher level of fairness preference need to be given higher incentives.
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spelling doaj.art-0da0240a184343a789d38195c8f7af0d2022-12-21T23:17:01ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782021-12-011210.3389/fpsyg.2021.796295796295Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple HeterogeneityLiuyang JiWenyao LiuYifan ZhangThe unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, which will lead to the complex effect of the traditional mechanism to regulate workers’ safety behavior. In order to improve the effectiveness of incentive measures for worker safety behavior, this paper takes into account the multiple differences of individual workers’ fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, based on the tournament mechanism to construct a competition incentive model. By designing a tournament reward and salary distribution for heterogeneous workers, the occurrence of unsafe behaviors can be reduced. The study found that in terms of the optimal level of safety investment, workers with risk aversion attitude generally invest higher than that of workers with risk preference, no matter whether they have a strong fairness preference or not; In terms of the distribution of tournament rewards, workers with a risk aversion attitude and a higher level of fairness preference need to be given higher incentives.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.796295/fullconstruction workerssafety behaviortournament incentive mechanismmultiple heterogeneityrisk appetite
spellingShingle Liuyang Ji
Wenyao Liu
Yifan Zhang
Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
Frontiers in Psychology
construction workers
safety behavior
tournament incentive mechanism
multiple heterogeneity
risk appetite
title Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
title_full Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
title_fullStr Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
title_full_unstemmed Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
title_short Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity
title_sort research on the tournament incentive mechanism of the safety behavior for construction workers considering multiple heterogeneity
topic construction workers
safety behavior
tournament incentive mechanism
multiple heterogeneity
risk appetite
url https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.796295/full
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AT yifanzhang researchonthetournamentincentivemechanismofthesafetybehaviorforconstructionworkersconsideringmultipleheterogeneity