Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories.
While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2024-01-01
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| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0301601&type=printable |
| _version_ | 1797194845495754752 |
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| author | J P Prims |
| author_facet | J P Prims |
| author_sort | J P Prims |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience "conspiracy blindness." People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for "conspiracy theory" and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-24T06:02:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0dec76dc36b94b578a5b1f08122bfb5a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-24T06:02:45Z |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj.art-0dec76dc36b94b578a5b1f08122bfb5a2024-04-23T05:31:50ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032024-01-01194e030160110.1371/journal.pone.0301601Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories.J P PrimsWhile conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience "conspiracy blindness." People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for "conspiracy theory" and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs.https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0301601&type=printable |
| spellingShingle | J P Prims Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. PLoS ONE |
| title | Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. |
| title_full | Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. |
| title_fullStr | Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. |
| title_short | Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories. |
| title_sort | call it a conspiracy how conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories |
| url | https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0301601&type=printable |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jpprims callitaconspiracyhowconspiracybeliefpredictsrecognitionofconspiracytheories |