Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development

In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parame...

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Main Author: Jan ČERVENKA
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Finance and Administration 2019-02-01
Series:ACTA VŠFS
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf
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author Jan ČERVENKA
author_facet Jan ČERVENKA
author_sort Jan ČERVENKA
collection DOAJ
description In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run.
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spelling doaj.art-0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f82022-12-21T17:43:10ZengUniversity of Finance and AdministrationACTA VŠFS1802-792X1802-79462019-02-011317993Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and DevelopmentJan ČERVENKA0University of Finance and Administration In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run.https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdfgame theorybargaining problembargaining solutionbargaining power
spellingShingle Jan ČERVENKA
Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
ACTA VŠFS
game theory
bargaining problem
bargaining solution
bargaining power
title Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
title_full Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
title_fullStr Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
title_full_unstemmed Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
title_short Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
title_sort bargaining power significance structure and development
topic game theory
bargaining problem
bargaining solution
bargaining power
url https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT jancervenka bargainingpowersignificancestructureanddevelopment