Some arguments for propositional logic: MacColl as a philosopher
The paper considers the philosophical, rather than mathematical or logical, reasons why MacColl decided to develop a propositional logic. We find some answers in a discrete refusal to countenance a logic of things, in MacColl’s qualified anti-psychologism, and in a subtle epistemology of certainty l...
Main Author: | J.-M. C. Chevalier |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Éditions Kimé
2011-04-01
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Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/368 |
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