Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things

In his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of rela...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: musa dibaj
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2009-09-01
Series:حکمت و فلسفه
Subjects:
Online Access:https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_5776_d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e.pdf
_version_ 1797387503360016384
author musa dibaj
author_facet musa dibaj
author_sort musa dibaj
collection DOAJ
description In his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of relations between spatial manifestations of things. Rather, space results solely from the possibilities of representation of space/place. However, our awareness of the reality of space/place does not depend on the experiential recognition of things. Human beings are engaged in space without having any primary experience of space, whereas Kant somehow reduces space to some external spatial aspect of things. Nevertheless, space amounts to more than what Kant considers to be the grasping/understanding of the pure form of space. The origin of space lies primarily/essentially beyond the human subjectivity and the boundaries of cognitive recognition of space/place. Kant regards space as the condition of the appearance of things that exist in the external world and become available to our perceptions, though there would be no relation between space and the determinations of things themselves. Therefore, one may ask where that space/place is where things in themselves exist. On the one hand, Kant does not provide any positive argument in order to dismiss the space itself that maintains the thing(s) in itself. On the other hand, if space is not a characteristic of a thing in itself, it cannot be said that the thing in itself is contained in space itself. If space is not given to us as a primary reality that is irreducible to the mere characteristics of things in themselves, things in themselves, as substances, would have nothing in common with space, whether substantial or not. If we do not accept that space is a place where things in themselves are, then where would those things in themselves be located? Moreover, where would we and our world be situated?
first_indexed 2024-03-08T22:26:04Z
format Article
id doaj.art-0ff9d58800344c8ba6f7e493f73037f4
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 1735-3238
2476-6038
language fas
last_indexed 2024-03-08T22:26:04Z
publishDate 2009-09-01
publisher Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
record_format Article
series حکمت و فلسفه
spelling doaj.art-0ff9d58800344c8ba6f7e493f73037f42023-12-18T10:38:06ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressحکمت و فلسفه1735-32382476-60382009-09-01519758410.22054/wph.2009.57765776Noumenal Space and Noumenal Thingsmusa dibaj0هیئت علمی دانشگاه تهرانIn his philosophical theory of space (and time), Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the relation that exists between things to each other in space (Verhaltnis) and the one that exists between space (and time) to us (Beziehung). He holds that space cannot be manifested by the mere experience of relations between spatial manifestations of things. Rather, space results solely from the possibilities of representation of space/place. However, our awareness of the reality of space/place does not depend on the experiential recognition of things. Human beings are engaged in space without having any primary experience of space, whereas Kant somehow reduces space to some external spatial aspect of things. Nevertheless, space amounts to more than what Kant considers to be the grasping/understanding of the pure form of space. The origin of space lies primarily/essentially beyond the human subjectivity and the boundaries of cognitive recognition of space/place. Kant regards space as the condition of the appearance of things that exist in the external world and become available to our perceptions, though there would be no relation between space and the determinations of things themselves. Therefore, one may ask where that space/place is where things in themselves exist. On the one hand, Kant does not provide any positive argument in order to dismiss the space itself that maintains the thing(s) in itself. On the other hand, if space is not a characteristic of a thing in itself, it cannot be said that the thing in itself is contained in space itself. If space is not given to us as a primary reality that is irreducible to the mere characteristics of things in themselves, things in themselves, as substances, would have nothing in common with space, whether substantial or not. If we do not accept that space is a place where things in themselves are, then where would those things in themselves be located? Moreover, where would we and our world be situated?https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_5776_d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e.pdfplacespacething in itselftranscendental philosophyimmanuel kantspatial phenomena
spellingShingle musa dibaj
Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
حکمت و فلسفه
place
space
thing in itself
transcendental philosophy
immanuel kant
spatial phenomena
title Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
title_full Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
title_fullStr Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
title_full_unstemmed Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
title_short Noumenal Space and Noumenal Things
title_sort noumenal space and noumenal things
topic place
space
thing in itself
transcendental philosophy
immanuel kant
spatial phenomena
url https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_5776_d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT musadibaj noumenalspaceandnoumenalthings