A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies
Single-factor password-based authentication is generally the norm to access on-line Web-sites. While single-factor authentication is well known to be a weak form of authentication, a further concern arises when considering the possibility for an attacker to recover the user passwords by leveraging t...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2020-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
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| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9037276/ |
| _version_ | 1818608529571840000 |
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| author | Simone Raponi Roberto Di Pietro |
| author_facet | Simone Raponi Roberto Di Pietro |
| author_sort | Simone Raponi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Single-factor password-based authentication is generally the norm to access on-line Web-sites. While single-factor authentication is well known to be a weak form of authentication, a further concern arises when considering the possibility for an attacker to recover the user passwords by leveraging the loopholes in the password recovery mechanisms. Indeed, the adoption by a Web-site of a poor password management system makes useless even the most robust password chosen by the registered users. In this paper, building on the results of our previous work, we study the possible attacks to on-line password recovery systems analyzing the mechanisms implemented by some of the most popular Web-sites. In detail, we provide several contributions: (i) we revise and detail the attacker model; (ii) we provide an updated analysis with respect to a preliminary study we carried out in December 2017; (iii) we perform a brand new analysis of the current top 200 Alexa's Web-sites of five major EU countries; and, (iv) we propose Maildust, a working open-source module that could be adopted by any Web-site to provide registered users with a password recovery mechanism to prevent mail service provider-level attacks. Overall, it is striking to notice how the analyzed Web-sites have made little (if any) effort to become compliant with the GDPR regulation, showing that the objective to have basic user protection mechanisms in place-despite the fines threatened by the GDPR-is still far, mainly because of sub-standard security management practices. Finally, it is worth noting that while this study has been focused on EU registered Web-sites, the proposed solution has, instead, general applicability. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T14:44:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-0ffb0d49bf804b659319418a7e58f13e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T14:44:06Z |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-0ffb0d49bf804b659319418a7e58f13e2022-12-21T22:27:49ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362020-01-018520755209010.1109/ACCESS.2020.29812079037276A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and RemediesSimone Raponi0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1813-546XRoberto Di Pietro1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1909-0336Information and Computing Technology Division, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, QatarInformation and Computing Technology Division, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, QatarSingle-factor password-based authentication is generally the norm to access on-line Web-sites. While single-factor authentication is well known to be a weak form of authentication, a further concern arises when considering the possibility for an attacker to recover the user passwords by leveraging the loopholes in the password recovery mechanisms. Indeed, the adoption by a Web-site of a poor password management system makes useless even the most robust password chosen by the registered users. In this paper, building on the results of our previous work, we study the possible attacks to on-line password recovery systems analyzing the mechanisms implemented by some of the most popular Web-sites. In detail, we provide several contributions: (i) we revise and detail the attacker model; (ii) we provide an updated analysis with respect to a preliminary study we carried out in December 2017; (iii) we perform a brand new analysis of the current top 200 Alexa's Web-sites of five major EU countries; and, (iv) we propose Maildust, a working open-source module that could be adopted by any Web-site to provide registered users with a password recovery mechanism to prevent mail service provider-level attacks. Overall, it is striking to notice how the analyzed Web-sites have made little (if any) effort to become compliant with the GDPR regulation, showing that the objective to have basic user protection mechanisms in place-despite the fines threatened by the GDPR-is still far, mainly because of sub-standard security management practices. Finally, it is worth noting that while this study has been focused on EU registered Web-sites, the proposed solution has, instead, general applicability.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9037276/Password recoveryauthenticationsecurity and privacy on the Web |
| spellingShingle | Simone Raponi Roberto Di Pietro A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies IEEE Access Password recovery authentication security and privacy on the Web |
| title | A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies |
| title_full | A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies |
| title_fullStr | A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies |
| title_short | A Longitudinal Study on Web-Sites Password Management (in)Security: Evidence and Remedies |
| title_sort | longitudinal study on web sites password management in security evidence and remedies |
| topic | Password recovery authentication security and privacy on the Web |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9037276/ |
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