The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended

The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider in detail the objections against the existentialist view of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids these objections, solving, specifically, the so-called "particularity problem." The main thesis i...

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Main Author: Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
Format: Article
Language:Portuguese
Published: Universidade Federal do Paraná 2012-10-01
Series:DoisPontos
Subjects:
Online Access:http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs/index.php/doispontos/article/view/26894
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author Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
author_facet Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
author_sort Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
collection DOAJ
description The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider in detail the objections against the existentialist view of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids these objections, solving, specifically, the so-called "particularity problem." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience must be understood as relativized, incomplete content (rather than a classical, complete proposition), modeled as a function of the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal relation, and world to truth-values.
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spelling doaj.art-10142e52b7794cc092aee30188c7b72a2022-12-21T18:57:49ZporUniversidade Federal do ParanáDoisPontos1807-38832179-74122012-10-010902638810.5380/dp.v9i2.26894The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defendedRoberto Horácio Sá Pereira0Unversidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider in detail the objections against the existentialist view of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids these objections, solving, specifically, the so-called "particularity problem." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience must be understood as relativized, incomplete content (rather than a classical, complete proposition), modeled as a function of the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal relation, and world to truth-values.http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs/index.php/doispontos/article/view/26894Existential content of perceptionRelativized content
spellingShingle Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
DoisPontos
Existential content of perception
Relativized content
title The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
title_full The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
title_fullStr The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
title_full_unstemmed The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
title_short The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended
title_sort existentialist view on the content of experience defended
topic Existential content of perception
Relativized content
url http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs/index.php/doispontos/article/view/26894
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