Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem
The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of bl...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Adam Mickiewicz University
2019-02-01
|
| Series: | Ethics in Progress |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/eip/article/view/17879 |
| _version_ | 1818228581745033216 |
|---|---|
| author | Ewa Nowak |
| author_facet | Ewa Nowak |
| author_sort | Ewa Nowak |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T10:04:59Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-102324917a00494ba45ae121455c86c6 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2084-9257 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T10:04:59Z |
| publishDate | 2019-02-01 |
| publisher | Adam Mickiewicz University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ethics in Progress |
| spelling | doaj.art-102324917a00494ba45ae121455c86c62022-12-22T00:27:54ZdeuAdam Mickiewicz UniversityEthics in Progress2084-92572019-02-019210.14746/eip.2018.2.1016787Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotemEwa Nowak0Adam Mickiewicz University in PoznańThe paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.http://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/eip/article/view/17879Wittgensteinethicspragmatismblind rule-followingconsidered and deliberated judgmentDiscourse Ethics |
| spellingShingle | Ewa Nowak Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem Ethics in Progress Wittgenstein ethics pragmatism blind rule-following considered and deliberated judgment Discourse Ethics |
| title | Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem |
| title_full | Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem |
| title_fullStr | Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem |
| title_full_unstemmed | Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem |
| title_short | Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem |
| title_sort | wittgenstein od etyki do slepego stosowania regul i z powrotem |
| topic | Wittgenstein ethics pragmatism blind rule-following considered and deliberated judgment Discourse Ethics |
| url | http://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/eip/article/view/17879 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ewanowak wittgensteinodetykidoslepegostosowaniaregułizpowrotem |