Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
The actual situation of carbon-emission reduction in China’s power sector has not yet achieved the expected benefits. The rent-seeking behavior of participants in power construction projects (PCPs) hinders the realization of low-carbon benefits. It is necessary to explore the behavioral strategies o...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Buildings |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/11/2874 |
| _version_ | 1827640259742007296 |
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| author | Lihong Li Rui Zhu Kun Song Ou Zhang Xue Jiang |
| author_facet | Lihong Li Rui Zhu Kun Song Ou Zhang Xue Jiang |
| author_sort | Lihong Li |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The actual situation of carbon-emission reduction in China’s power sector has not yet achieved the expected benefits. The rent-seeking behavior of participants in power construction projects (PCPs) hinders the realization of low-carbon benefits. It is necessary to explore the behavioral strategies of the various participants in the low-carbon transition of PCPs. This paper creatively constructs an evolutionary game model of PCPs’ participants from the perspective of MRV (monitoring, reporting, and verification) and introduces the influence of the public to provide a comprehensive analysis of strategic equilibrium points. Through numerical simulations with MATLAB R2021a software, this paper explores the strategic choices of participants in different situations and gives relevant inferences and proofs. The results show that the grid company dominates at the initial stage and promotes participants to regulate behaviors. Under the premise of satisfying the system-stability requirements, setting the growth rate of the grid company’s punishments to 100% can enhance the willingness for strict supervision, while the growth rate of the supervision costs to 200% significantly decreases the probability of strict supervision. With the integration of MRV and PCPs, participants spontaneously fulfill the carbon-emission-reduction tasks. Reasonable control of input costs can effectively avoid the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior. In addition, this paper sets the public-influence growth rate at 200% and finds that the public plays a greater role in driving participants to fulfill responsibilities. Based on the results, a low-carbon transition mechanism for PCPs under the MRV system is proposed by considering several dimensions, which provides suggestions for participants to fulfill carbon-reduction responsibilities. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T16:57:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-11b7715d23e34c00a42208cb4dba130d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2075-5309 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T16:57:20Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Buildings |
| spelling | doaj.art-11b7715d23e34c00a42208cb4dba130d2023-11-24T14:33:46ZengMDPI AGBuildings2075-53092023-11-011311287410.3390/buildings13112874Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game AnalysisLihong Li0Rui Zhu1Kun Song2Ou Zhang3Xue Jiang4School of Management, Shenyang Jianzhu University, Shenyang 110168, ChinaSchool of Management, Shenyang Jianzhu University, Shenyang 110168, ChinaState Grid Liaoning Electric Power Company Limited, Economic Research Institute, Shenyang 110015, ChinaState Grid Liaoning Electric Power Company Limited, Economic Research Institute, Shenyang 110015, ChinaState Grid Liaoning Electric Power Company Limited, Economic Research Institute, Shenyang 110015, ChinaThe actual situation of carbon-emission reduction in China’s power sector has not yet achieved the expected benefits. The rent-seeking behavior of participants in power construction projects (PCPs) hinders the realization of low-carbon benefits. It is necessary to explore the behavioral strategies of the various participants in the low-carbon transition of PCPs. This paper creatively constructs an evolutionary game model of PCPs’ participants from the perspective of MRV (monitoring, reporting, and verification) and introduces the influence of the public to provide a comprehensive analysis of strategic equilibrium points. Through numerical simulations with MATLAB R2021a software, this paper explores the strategic choices of participants in different situations and gives relevant inferences and proofs. The results show that the grid company dominates at the initial stage and promotes participants to regulate behaviors. Under the premise of satisfying the system-stability requirements, setting the growth rate of the grid company’s punishments to 100% can enhance the willingness for strict supervision, while the growth rate of the supervision costs to 200% significantly decreases the probability of strict supervision. With the integration of MRV and PCPs, participants spontaneously fulfill the carbon-emission-reduction tasks. Reasonable control of input costs can effectively avoid the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior. In addition, this paper sets the public-influence growth rate at 200% and finds that the public plays a greater role in driving participants to fulfill responsibilities. Based on the results, a low-carbon transition mechanism for PCPs under the MRV system is proposed by considering several dimensions, which provides suggestions for participants to fulfill carbon-reduction responsibilities.https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/11/2874power construction projectslow-carbon transitionMRVevolutionary game theory |
| spellingShingle | Lihong Li Rui Zhu Kun Song Ou Zhang Xue Jiang Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Buildings power construction projects low-carbon transition MRV evolutionary game theory |
| title | Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis |
| title_full | Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis |
| title_fullStr | Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis |
| title_short | Promoting the Low-Carbon Transition of Power Construction Projects under MRV: An Evolutionary Game Analysis |
| title_sort | promoting the low carbon transition of power construction projects under mrv an evolutionary game analysis |
| topic | power construction projects low-carbon transition MRV evolutionary game theory |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/13/11/2874 |
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