Backward Induction for Repeated Games
We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion of 'topologically compact' nondeter...
Main Author: | Jules Hedges |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Open Publishing Association
2018-07-01
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Series: | Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science |
Online Access: | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.07074v2 |
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