Second-order impartiality and public sphere
In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry’s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyd...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2016-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2016/0353-57381604757S.pdf |
| Summary: | In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order
impartiality, along with Brian Barry’s thorough elaboration of their
characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the
former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday
occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society
and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the
concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two
examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive
membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but
nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz
dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry’s
interpretation, arguing that Heinz’s right of giving advantage to his wife’s
life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating
circum-stances, and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere.
Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity
of political impartiality implied in second-order morality. [Projekat
Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049] |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |