A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)

We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction of better-response dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibr...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Stéphane Le Roux, Arno Pauly
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2016-09-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.04099v1
_version_ 1811303237902401536
author Stéphane Le Roux
Arno Pauly
author_facet Stéphane Le Roux
Arno Pauly
author_sort Stéphane Le Roux
collection DOAJ
description We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction of better-response dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibrium in quadratic time. Convergence happens on a per-player basis, and even in the presence of players with cyclic preferences, the players with acyclic preferences will stabilize. Thus, we obtain a candidate notion for rationality in the presence of irrational agents. Moreover, the restriction of convertibility can be justified by a conservative updating of beliefs about the other players strategies. For infinite sequential games we can retain convergence to a Nash equilibrium (in some sense), if the preferences are given by continuous payoff functions; or obtain a transfinite convergence if the outcome sets of the game are Delta^0_2 sets.
first_indexed 2024-04-13T07:44:22Z
format Article
id doaj.art-13417d63bbe44c0f82501f8ac922a651
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2075-2180
language English
last_indexed 2024-04-13T07:44:22Z
publishDate 2016-09-01
publisher Open Publishing Association
record_format Article
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
spelling doaj.art-13417d63bbe44c0f82501f8ac922a6512022-12-22T02:55:45ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802016-09-01226Proc. GandALF 201624225610.4204/EPTCS.226.17:15A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)Stéphane Le Roux0Arno Pauly1 Universite libre de Bruxelles Universite libre de Bruxelles We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction of better-response dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibrium in quadratic time. Convergence happens on a per-player basis, and even in the presence of players with cyclic preferences, the players with acyclic preferences will stabilize. Thus, we obtain a candidate notion for rationality in the presence of irrational agents. Moreover, the restriction of convertibility can be justified by a conservative updating of beliefs about the other players strategies. For infinite sequential games we can retain convergence to a Nash equilibrium (in some sense), if the preferences are given by continuous payoff functions; or obtain a transfinite convergence if the outcome sets of the game are Delta^0_2 sets.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.04099v1
spellingShingle Stéphane Le Roux
Arno Pauly
A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
title A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
title_full A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
title_fullStr A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
title_full_unstemmed A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
title_short A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract)
title_sort semi potential for finite and infinite sequential games extended abstract
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.04099v1
work_keys_str_mv AT stephaneleroux asemipotentialforfiniteandinfinitesequentialgamesextendedabstract
AT arnopauly asemipotentialforfiniteandinfinitesequentialgamesextendedabstract
AT stephaneleroux semipotentialforfiniteandinfinitesequentialgamesextendedabstract
AT arnopauly semipotentialforfiniteandinfinitesequentialgamesextendedabstract