Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play
The finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic rea...
Main Authors: | Kristian Lindgren, Vilhelm Verendel |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2013-01-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/1/1 |
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