Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
Some of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2012-09-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421 |
| _version_ | 1818191717794316288 |
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| author | Mark Vorobej |
| author_facet | Mark Vorobej |
| author_sort | Mark Vorobej |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Some of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the different roles that premises can play in moral argumentation. Most significantly, I argue that both intensifiers and enablers play parallel roles within different kinds of (more primitive) supplementation relations. This matters since it is common for people to accept Dancy's account of intensifiers while remaining suspicious of his notion of enablers. But this asymmetrical response, I argue, cannot be justified. This account also generates a simpler and more elegant argument in support of moral particularism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T00:19:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-138a2d59a47c40c7a8faff0bc31d99d5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0824-2577 0824-2577 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T00:19:03Z |
| publishDate | 2012-09-01 |
| publisher | University of Windsor |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Informal Logic |
| spelling | doaj.art-138a2d59a47c40c7a8faff0bc31d99d52022-12-22T00:44:46ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25770824-25772012-09-0132330631210.22329/il.v32i3.34213104Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral ParticularismMark Vorobej0McMaster UniversitySome of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the different roles that premises can play in moral argumentation. Most significantly, I argue that both intensifiers and enablers play parallel roles within different kinds of (more primitive) supplementation relations. This matters since it is common for people to accept Dancy's account of intensifiers while remaining suspicious of his notion of enablers. But this asymmetrical response, I argue, cannot be justified. This account also generates a simpler and more elegant argument in support of moral particularism.https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421Jonathan Dancymoral particularismreasonsrelevanceintensifiersenablershybrid arguments |
| spellingShingle | Mark Vorobej Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism Informal Logic Jonathan Dancy moral particularism reasons relevance intensifiers enablers hybrid arguments |
| title | Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism |
| title_full | Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism |
| title_fullStr | Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism |
| title_short | Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism |
| title_sort | moral hybrids moral relevance and moral particularism |
| topic | Jonathan Dancy moral particularism reasons relevance intensifiers enablers hybrid arguments |
| url | https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3421 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT markvorobej moralhybridsmoralrelevanceandmoralparticularism |