A game of bank resolution
Before the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions were aware that if they were large enough they would be rescued with tax-payers’ money, an action also known as bail-out, what became known as “too big to fail”. The BRRD proposes a legal framework that aims at eliminating the possibility of bail...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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General Association of Economists from Romania
2018-03-01
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| Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
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| Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/suplimente/International_Finance_and_Banking_Conference_FIBA_2018_XVI.pdf#page=209
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| Summary: | Before the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions were aware that if they were large enough
they would be rescued with tax-payers’ money, an action also known as bail-out, what became known
as “too big to fail”. The BRRD proposes a legal framework that aims at eliminating the possibility of
bailing-out credit institutions. This paper has the objective of assessing through a game theory analysis
to what extent the BRRD has the potential to achieve its purpose and if there are identifiable
improvements to this framework that could be considered for practical purposes or for a possible review
of the framework. |
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| ISSN: | 1841-8678 1844-0029 |