A game of bank resolution
Before the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions were aware that if they were large enough they would be rescued with tax-payers’ money, an action also known as bail-out, what became known as “too big to fail”. The BRRD proposes a legal framework that aims at eliminating the possibility of bail...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2018-03-01
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| Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/suplimente/International_Finance_and_Banking_Conference_FIBA_2018_XVI.pdf#page=209
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| _version_ | 1811221935997059072 |
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| author | Gabriel MITRACHE |
| author_facet | Gabriel MITRACHE |
| author_sort | Gabriel MITRACHE |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Before the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions were aware that if they were large enough
they would be rescued with tax-payers’ money, an action also known as bail-out, what became known
as “too big to fail”. The BRRD proposes a legal framework that aims at eliminating the possibility of
bailing-out credit institutions. This paper has the objective of assessing through a game theory analysis
to what extent the BRRD has the potential to achieve its purpose and if there are identifiable
improvements to this framework that could be considered for practical purposes or for a possible review
of the framework. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T08:08:32Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1391194fc0094cdf83b11510664bc469 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1841-8678 1844-0029 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T08:08:32Z |
| publishDate | 2018-03-01 |
| publisher | General Association of Economists from Romania |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| spelling | doaj.art-1391194fc0094cdf83b11510664bc4692022-12-22T03:41:02ZengGeneral Association of Economists from RomaniaTheoretical and Applied Economics1841-86781844-00292018-03-01XXVSpecial20921718418678A game of bank resolutionGabriel MITRACHE0 Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania Before the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions were aware that if they were large enough they would be rescued with tax-payers’ money, an action also known as bail-out, what became known as “too big to fail”. The BRRD proposes a legal framework that aims at eliminating the possibility of bailing-out credit institutions. This paper has the objective of assessing through a game theory analysis to what extent the BRRD has the potential to achieve its purpose and if there are identifiable improvements to this framework that could be considered for practical purposes or for a possible review of the framework. http://store.ectap.ro/suplimente/International_Finance_and_Banking_Conference_FIBA_2018_XVI.pdf#page=209 bankingbank resolutionbank supervisionbrrdgame theory |
| spellingShingle | Gabriel MITRACHE A game of bank resolution Theoretical and Applied Economics banking bank resolution bank supervision brrd game theory |
| title | A game of bank resolution |
| title_full | A game of bank resolution |
| title_fullStr | A game of bank resolution |
| title_full_unstemmed | A game of bank resolution |
| title_short | A game of bank resolution |
| title_sort | game of bank resolution |
| topic | banking bank resolution bank supervision brrd game theory |
| url |
http://store.ectap.ro/suplimente/International_Finance_and_Banking_Conference_FIBA_2018_XVI.pdf#page=209
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| work_keys_str_mv | AT gabrielmitrache agameofbankresolution AT gabrielmitrache gameofbankresolution |