Cryptanalysis of matrix conjugation schemes
In this paper we cryptanalyze two protocols: the Grigoriev–Shpilrain authentication protocol and a public key cryptosystem due to Wang, Wang, Cao, Okamoto and Shao. Both of these protocols use the computational hardness of some variations of the conjugacy search problem in a class of noncommutative...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
De Gruyter
2014-06-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2012-0033 |
| Summary: | In this paper we cryptanalyze two protocols: the Grigoriev–Shpilrain
authentication protocol and a public key cryptosystem due to Wang, Wang, Cao, Okamoto and Shao.
Both of these protocols use the computational hardness of some variations of the conjugacy search problem
in a class of noncommutative monoids. We devise a practical heuristic algorithm
solving those problems.
As a conclusion we claim that these protocols are insecure for the proposed parameter values. |
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| ISSN: | 1862-2976 1862-2984 |