The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations

This paper offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s idea of non-ideal relations inhering in one subject. Such single-inhering relations should not be understood in terms of non-relational, absolute properties, but in terms of per...

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Main Author: Florian Vermeiren
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2023-03-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/articles/240
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author Florian Vermeiren
author_facet Florian Vermeiren
author_sort Florian Vermeiren
collection DOAJ
description This paper offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s idea of non-ideal relations inhering in one subject. Such single-inhering relations should not be understood in terms of non-relational, absolute properties, but in terms of perspectival relations. Through the notion of perspective, we can understand how a relation between two relata inheres in only one of those relata. For example, my perception of you involves my point of view. Therefore, it is individual to me. My perception of you is not equal to your perception of me. However, it does relate me to you. Perspective can thus explain how relations only inhere in one subject while nevertheless really relating one thing to another. This leads to a novel understanding of the rejection of purely extrinsic denominations and the supposed isolation of substances.
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spelling doaj.art-149f68917f0b41aba37f3171f40443262023-04-17T07:10:49ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522023-03-015110.32881/jomp.24053The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian RelationsFlorian Vermeiren0Husserl-Archives: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU LeuvenThis paper offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s idea of non-ideal relations inhering in one subject. Such single-inhering relations should not be understood in terms of non-relational, absolute properties, but in terms of perspectival relations. Through the notion of perspective, we can understand how a relation between two relata inheres in only one of those relata. For example, my perception of you involves my point of view. Therefore, it is individual to me. My perception of you is not equal to your perception of me. However, it does relate me to you. Perspective can thus explain how relations only inhere in one subject while nevertheless really relating one thing to another. This leads to a novel understanding of the rejection of purely extrinsic denominations and the supposed isolation of substances.https://jmphil.org/articles/240leibnizrelationsperspectiveextrinsic denominationsindividuality
spellingShingle Florian Vermeiren
The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
Journal of Modern Philosophy
leibniz
relations
perspective
extrinsic denominations
individuality
title The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
title_full The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
title_fullStr The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
title_full_unstemmed The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
title_short The Perspectival Nature of Leibnizian Relations
title_sort perspectival nature of leibnizian relations
topic leibniz
relations
perspective
extrinsic denominations
individuality
url https://jmphil.org/articles/240
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