Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference
Cost allocation is a way to promote enterprises to actively implement green supply chain management, and the behavior preference of decision makers will affect the process. This paper considers the situation that manufacturer has fairness preference and retailer is fair neutral, and constructs a sec...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2021-11-01
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| Series: | Energy Reports |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721008258 |
| _version_ | 1819174817574682624 |
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| author | Qin Qin Maoting Jiang Jianmin Xie Yi He |
| author_facet | Qin Qin Maoting Jiang Jianmin Xie Yi He |
| author_sort | Qin Qin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Cost allocation is a way to promote enterprises to actively implement green supply chain management, and the behavior preference of decision makers will affect the process. This paper considers the situation that manufacturer has fairness preference and retailer is fair neutral, and constructs a secondary supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We explore two models of cost allocation—based on the Stackelberg model, the impact of retailers’ nonparticipation/participation in cost allocation on supply chain is discussed, while through the Nash bargaining model, the range and optimal solution of the environmental cost allocation ratio are determined. And we show how product wholesale prices, retail prices, green innovation investment, and the optimal ratio of environmental cost allocation are influenced by fairness preference. The results show that retailers’ participation in environmental cost allocation will increase the level of product greenness and make the entire supply chain Pareto optimal. The strong fairness preference of manufacturer will weaken the positive effect of retailers participating in cost allocation on the supply chain. Therefore, the government and enterprises should adopt incentive measures to actively promote the collaboration between channel partners in order to share the environmental cost, and manufacturers should pay less attention to fairness. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T20:45:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-14a7ad439c04422395f1a8cea47126ba |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2352-4847 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T20:45:00Z |
| publishDate | 2021-11-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energy Reports |
| spelling | doaj.art-14a7ad439c04422395f1a8cea47126ba2022-12-21T18:13:15ZengElsevierEnergy Reports2352-48472021-11-01760146022Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preferenceQin Qin0Maoting Jiang1Jianmin Xie2Yi He3School of Economics & Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, 6210100, ChinaCorrespondence to: Southwest University of Science and Technology, No.59, Middle Section of Qinglong Avenue, Fucheng District, Mianyang City, Sichuan Province, China.; School of Economics & Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, 6210100, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, 6210100, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, 6210100, ChinaCost allocation is a way to promote enterprises to actively implement green supply chain management, and the behavior preference of decision makers will affect the process. This paper considers the situation that manufacturer has fairness preference and retailer is fair neutral, and constructs a secondary supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We explore two models of cost allocation—based on the Stackelberg model, the impact of retailers’ nonparticipation/participation in cost allocation on supply chain is discussed, while through the Nash bargaining model, the range and optimal solution of the environmental cost allocation ratio are determined. And we show how product wholesale prices, retail prices, green innovation investment, and the optimal ratio of environmental cost allocation are influenced by fairness preference. The results show that retailers’ participation in environmental cost allocation will increase the level of product greenness and make the entire supply chain Pareto optimal. The strong fairness preference of manufacturer will weaken the positive effect of retailers participating in cost allocation on the supply chain. Therefore, the government and enterprises should adopt incentive measures to actively promote the collaboration between channel partners in order to share the environmental cost, and manufacturers should pay less attention to fairness.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721008258Green supply chainFairness preferenceStackelberg gameCost allocation |
| spellingShingle | Qin Qin Maoting Jiang Jianmin Xie Yi He Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference Energy Reports Green supply chain Fairness preference Stackelberg game Cost allocation |
| title | Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| title_full | Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| title_fullStr | Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| title_short | Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| title_sort | game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference |
| topic | Green supply chain Fairness preference Stackelberg game Cost allocation |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721008258 |
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