The lack of structure of knowledge

For a long time philosophers have struggled to reach a definition of knowledge that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive standard. However, what could be so fuzzy about the concept of knowledge that it makes our intuitions to not obviously support a single analysis? One particular approach from a...

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Main Author: Arthur Viana Lopes
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal da Paraíba 2018-09-01
Series:Aufklärung
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/arf/article/view/41957
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author Arthur Viana Lopes
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author_sort Arthur Viana Lopes
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description For a long time philosophers have struggled to reach a definition of knowledge that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive standard. However, what could be so fuzzy about the concept of knowledge that it makes our intuitions to not obviously support a single analysis? One particular approach from a naturalistic perspective treats this question from the point of view of the psychology of concepts. According to it, this failure is explained by the structure of our folk concept of knowledge, which organizes its constitutive information in a much looser way than we assume when we rely on intuitive knowledge ascriptions. I will adopt the same starting point here, but argue against the proposed answer and defend the view that this difficulty is explained not by something related to the specific structure of our concept of knowledge but, on the contrary, by its lack of structure. I claim that our folk concept of knowledge should be understood as a primitive mental state concept.
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spelling doaj.art-14d27c6b3fdc448486db591d390d84c02022-12-21T21:46:06ZengUniversidade Federal da ParaíbaAufklärung2318-94282018-09-015210.18012/arf.2016.41957The lack of structure of knowledgeArthur Viana Lopes0Universidade Federal da ParaíbaFor a long time philosophers have struggled to reach a definition of knowledge that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive standard. However, what could be so fuzzy about the concept of knowledge that it makes our intuitions to not obviously support a single analysis? One particular approach from a naturalistic perspective treats this question from the point of view of the psychology of concepts. According to it, this failure is explained by the structure of our folk concept of knowledge, which organizes its constitutive information in a much looser way than we assume when we rely on intuitive knowledge ascriptions. I will adopt the same starting point here, but argue against the proposed answer and defend the view that this difficulty is explained not by something related to the specific structure of our concept of knowledge but, on the contrary, by its lack of structure. I claim that our folk concept of knowledge should be understood as a primitive mental state concept.https://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/arf/article/view/41957Analysis of knowledgePsychology of conceptsMindreading
spellingShingle Arthur Viana Lopes
The lack of structure of knowledge
Aufklärung
Analysis of knowledge
Psychology of concepts
Mindreading
title The lack of structure of knowledge
title_full The lack of structure of knowledge
title_fullStr The lack of structure of knowledge
title_full_unstemmed The lack of structure of knowledge
title_short The lack of structure of knowledge
title_sort lack of structure of knowledge
topic Analysis of knowledge
Psychology of concepts
Mindreading
url https://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/arf/article/view/41957
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