| Summary: | The two most
fundamental notions in mechanism design are truthfulness and efficiency. In
many market settings, such as the classic one-sided matching/assignment
setting, these two properties partially conflict, creating a trade-off which is
rarely examined in the real-world. In this article, we investigate this
trade-off through the high-stakes Israeli medical internship market. This
market used to employ a standard truthful yet sub-optimal mechanism and it has
recently transitioned to an ``almost'' truthful, more efficient mechanism.
Through this in-the-field study, spanning over two years, we study the interns'
behavior using both official data and targeted surveys. We first identify that
substantial strategic behaviors are exercised by the participants, virtually
eliminating any efficiency gains from the transition. In order to mitigate the
above, we performed an intervention in which conclusive evidence was provided
showing that, for most of the interns, reporting truthfully was much better
than what they actually did. Unfortunately, a re-examination of the market
reveals that our intervention had only minor effects. These results combine to
question the practical benefits of ``almost'' truthfulness in real-world market
settings and shed new light on the typical truthfulness-efficiency
trade-off.
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