T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements
False data injection (FDI) attacks are a major security threat to smart grid (SG) communication systems. In FDI attacks, the attacker has the ability of modifying the measurements transmitted by smart grid entities such as smart meters, buses, etc. Many solutions have been proposed to mitigate FDI a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2019-07-01
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| Series: | Energies |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/12/13/2555 |
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| author | Israa T. Aziz Hai Jin Ihsan H. Abdulqadder Sabah M. Alturfi Wisam H. Alobaidi Firas M.F. Flaih |
| author_facet | Israa T. Aziz Hai Jin Ihsan H. Abdulqadder Sabah M. Alturfi Wisam H. Alobaidi Firas M.F. Flaih |
| author_sort | Israa T. Aziz |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | False data injection (FDI) attacks are a major security threat to smart grid (SG) communication systems. In FDI attacks, the attacker has the ability of modifying the measurements transmitted by smart grid entities such as smart meters, buses, etc. Many solutions have been proposed to mitigate FDI attacks in the SG. However, most of these solutions rely on centralized state estimation (SE), which is computationally expensive. To engulf this problem in FDI attack detection and to improve security of SGs, this paper proposes novel two-tier secure smart grid (T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G) architecture with distributed SE. In T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G, measurement collection and SE are involved in first tier while compromised meter detection is involved in second tier. Initially the overall SG system is divided into four sections by the weighted quad tree (WQT) method. Each section is provided with an aggregator, which is responsible to perform SE. Measurements from power grids are collected by remote terminal units (RTUs) and encrypted using a parallel enhanced elliptic curve cryptography (PEECC) algorithm. Then the measurements are transmitted to the corresponding aggregator. Upon collected measurements, aggregator estimates state using the amended particle swarm optimization (APSO) algorithm in a distributed manner. To verify authenticity of aggregators, each aggregator is authenticated by a logical schedule based authentication (LSA) scheme at the control server (CS). In the CS, fuzzy with a neural network (FNN) algorithm is employed for measurements classification. Our proposed T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G shows promising results in the following performance metrics: Estimation error, number of protected measurements, detection probability, successful detection rate, and detection delay. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T06:52:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-159a9ac967f64a0e8df75cf5a787c52f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1996-1073 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T06:52:53Z |
| publishDate | 2019-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energies |
| spelling | doaj.art-159a9ac967f64a0e8df75cf5a787c52f2022-12-22T02:57:20ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732019-07-011213255510.3390/en12132555en12132555T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network MeasurementsIsraa T. Aziz0Hai Jin1Ihsan H. Abdulqadder2Sabah M. Alturfi3Wisam H. Alobaidi4Firas M.F. Flaih5Cluster and Grid Computing Laboratory, Services Computing Technology and System Laboratory, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, ChinaCluster and Grid Computing Laboratory, Services Computing Technology and System Laboratory, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, ChinaThe School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, ChinaCollege of Law, University of Kerbala, Karbala 56001, IraqState Company of the North Distribution Electricity, Ministry of Electricity, Baghdad 10013, IraqState Company of the North Distribution Electricity, Ministry of Electricity, Baghdad 10013, IraqFalse data injection (FDI) attacks are a major security threat to smart grid (SG) communication systems. In FDI attacks, the attacker has the ability of modifying the measurements transmitted by smart grid entities such as smart meters, buses, etc. Many solutions have been proposed to mitigate FDI attacks in the SG. However, most of these solutions rely on centralized state estimation (SE), which is computationally expensive. To engulf this problem in FDI attack detection and to improve security of SGs, this paper proposes novel two-tier secure smart grid (T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G) architecture with distributed SE. In T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G, measurement collection and SE are involved in first tier while compromised meter detection is involved in second tier. Initially the overall SG system is divided into four sections by the weighted quad tree (WQT) method. Each section is provided with an aggregator, which is responsible to perform SE. Measurements from power grids are collected by remote terminal units (RTUs) and encrypted using a parallel enhanced elliptic curve cryptography (PEECC) algorithm. Then the measurements are transmitted to the corresponding aggregator. Upon collected measurements, aggregator estimates state using the amended particle swarm optimization (APSO) algorithm in a distributed manner. To verify authenticity of aggregators, each aggregator is authenticated by a logical schedule based authentication (LSA) scheme at the control server (CS). In the CS, fuzzy with a neural network (FNN) algorithm is employed for measurements classification. Our proposed T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G shows promising results in the following performance metrics: Estimation error, number of protected measurements, detection probability, successful detection rate, and detection delay.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/12/13/2555FDI attackspower grid measurementsdistributed state estimationcompromised metersmart grid |
| spellingShingle | Israa T. Aziz Hai Jin Ihsan H. Abdulqadder Sabah M. Alturfi Wisam H. Alobaidi Firas M.F. Flaih T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements Energies FDI attacks power grid measurements distributed state estimation compromised meter smart grid |
| title | T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements |
| title_full | T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements |
| title_fullStr | T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements |
| title_full_unstemmed | T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements |
| title_short | T<sup>2</sup>S<sup>2</sup>G: A Novel Two-Tier Secure Smart Grid Architecture to Protect Network Measurements |
| title_sort | t sup 2 sup s sup 2 sup g a novel two tier secure smart grid architecture to protect network measurements |
| topic | FDI attacks power grid measurements distributed state estimation compromised meter smart grid |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/12/13/2555 |
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