Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination
‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hege...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381703579W.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818360666460782592 |
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| author | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| author_facet | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| author_sort | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | ‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human
rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for
omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers
have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies
his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997)
has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit
that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its
value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient
both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology
and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal
domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is
constitutive of the equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007) -
both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational
justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or
imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral,
political and juridical implication of Hegel’s analysis of mutual
recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational
justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to
non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit
domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of
its social, political and economic structures and functioning. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T21:04:25Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-15b611262a194c72bc8e7312571790e0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T21:04:25Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Filozofija i Društvo |
| spelling | doaj.art-15b611262a194c72bc8e7312571790e02022-12-21T23:31:30ZdeuInstitute for Philosophy and Social Theory, BelgradeFilozofija i Društvo0353-57382334-85772017-01-0128357961210.2298/FID1703579W0353-57381703579WHegel’s justification of the human right to non-dominationWestphal Kenneth R.0Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Department of Philosophy, İstanbul, Turkey‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant’s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007) - both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning.http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381703579W.pdfHegelhuman rightsnon-dominationPettitrepublicanismjustificationrecognition |
| spellingShingle | Westphal Kenneth R. Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination Filozofija i Društvo Hegel human rights non-domination Pettit republicanism justification recognition |
| title | Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination |
| title_full | Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination |
| title_fullStr | Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination |
| title_short | Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination |
| title_sort | hegel s justification of the human right to non domination |
| topic | Hegel human rights non-domination Pettit republicanism justification recognition |
| url | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381703579W.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT westphalkennethr hegelsjustificationofthehumanrighttonondomination |