Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies

For Locke, as the standard story goes, good and evil assume a specifically moral significance only by dint of their being attached to divine legislation. This would seem to leave little to no role for intrinsically moral motives to play in reasoning practically about one’s moral duty. However...

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Main Author: Patricia Sheridan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Libraries, The University of Western Ontario 2015-12-01
Series:Locke Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/690
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author Patricia Sheridan
author_facet Patricia Sheridan
author_sort Patricia Sheridan
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description For Locke, as the standard story goes, good and evil assume a specifically moral significance only by dint of their being attached to divine legislation. This would seem to leave little to no role for intrinsically moral motives to play in reasoning practically about one’s moral duty. However, a re-examination of certain of Locke’s texts, particularly against the backdrop of the seventeenth-century Latitudinarian tradition, suggests that Locke is not uniformly committed to an externalist account of motivation. There are a number of instances throughout Locke’s works, I want to show, where he refers not only to the inherent righteousness of moral law as reason-giving for moral agents, but also to particular moral feelings as motivating moral acts.
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spelling doaj.art-16443fee2d61451db0b6d9d3aebba6f22022-12-22T17:00:43ZengWestern Libraries, The University of Western OntarioLocke Studies2561-925X2015-12-011510.5206/ls.2015.690Locke's Latitudinarian SympathiesPatricia Sheridan For Locke, as the standard story goes, good and evil assume a specifically moral significance only by dint of their being attached to divine legislation. This would seem to leave little to no role for intrinsically moral motives to play in reasoning practically about one’s moral duty. However, a re-examination of certain of Locke’s texts, particularly against the backdrop of the seventeenth-century Latitudinarian tradition, suggests that Locke is not uniformly committed to an externalist account of motivation. There are a number of instances throughout Locke’s works, I want to show, where he refers not only to the inherent righteousness of moral law as reason-giving for moral agents, but also to particular moral feelings as motivating moral acts. https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/690John Locke
spellingShingle Patricia Sheridan
Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
Locke Studies
John Locke
title Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
title_full Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
title_fullStr Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
title_full_unstemmed Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
title_short Locke's Latitudinarian Sympathies
title_sort locke s latitudinarian sympathies
topic John Locke
url https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/690
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