A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies
A solution to help victims against phishing is anticipating and leveraging impacts related to phisher actions.In this regard, this work reshapes game theoretical logic between Intrusion Detection System (IDS) agents andinsiders to email spear-phishing interactions. The email spear-phishing attack is...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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European Alliance for Innovation (EAI)
2021-04-01
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| Series: | EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.26-5-2020.166354 |
| _version_ | 1818618071632314368 |
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| author | Franklin Tchakounte Virgile Nyassi Duplex Danga Kalum Udagepola Marcellin Atemkeng |
| author_facet | Franklin Tchakounte Virgile Nyassi Duplex Danga Kalum Udagepola Marcellin Atemkeng |
| author_sort | Franklin Tchakounte |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | A solution to help victims against phishing is anticipating and leveraging impacts related to phisher actions.In this regard, this work reshapes game theoretical logic between Intrusion Detection System (IDS) agents andinsiders to email spear-phishing interactions. The email spear-phishing attack is designed as a non-cooperativeand repeated game between opponents. Additionally, this work relies on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE)to build a game theoretical approach to predict the phisher’s future intent based on past actions of bothplayers. This approach is coupled with a recommendation strategy of appropriate allocation of resources toinvest to strengthen user protection. Simulations on spear-phishing scenarios demonstrate the ability of thefinal system to intuitively guess the most likely phisher decisions. This work provides intelligence to spear-phishing detectors and humans such that they can anticipate next phisher actions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T17:15:46Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-166177a4a43c4aeaab2a18533455091e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2032-9407 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T17:15:46Z |
| publishDate | 2021-04-01 |
| publisher | European Alliance for Innovation (EAI) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-166177a4a43c4aeaab2a18533455091e2022-12-21T22:23:18ZengEuropean Alliance for Innovation (EAI)EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems2032-94072021-04-0183010.4108/eai.26-5-2020.166354A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing StrategiesFranklin Tchakounte0Virgile Nyassi1Duplex Danga2Kalum Udagepola3Marcellin Atemkeng4Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Faculty of Science, University of Ngaoundéré, CameroonLaboratory of Mathematics and Applications (LAMAP), University of Ngaoundéré, CameroonDepartment of Mathematics and Computer Science, Faculty of Science, University of Ngaoundéré, CameroonDepartment of Mathematics and Computer Science, Faculty of Science, University of Ngaoundéré, CameroonLaboratory of Mathematics and Applications (LAMAP), University of Ngaoundéré, CameroonResearch Development Institute of Technology, AustraliaDepartment of Mathematics, Rhodes University, 6140 Grahamstown, South AfricaA solution to help victims against phishing is anticipating and leveraging impacts related to phisher actions.In this regard, this work reshapes game theoretical logic between Intrusion Detection System (IDS) agents andinsiders to email spear-phishing interactions. The email spear-phishing attack is designed as a non-cooperativeand repeated game between opponents. Additionally, this work relies on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE)to build a game theoretical approach to predict the phisher’s future intent based on past actions of bothplayers. This approach is coupled with a recommendation strategy of appropriate allocation of resources toinvest to strengthen user protection. Simulations on spear-phishing scenarios demonstrate the ability of thefinal system to intuitively guess the most likely phisher decisions. This work provides intelligence to spear-phishing detectors and humans such that they can anticipate next phisher actions.https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.26-5-2020.166354attackgame theorynon-cooperative gameemail spear-phishingqre |
| spellingShingle | Franklin Tchakounte Virgile Nyassi Duplex Danga Kalum Udagepola Marcellin Atemkeng A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies EAI Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information Systems attack game theory non-cooperative game email spear-phishing qre |
| title | A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies |
| title_full | A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies |
| title_fullStr | A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies |
| title_short | A Game Theoretical Model for Anticipating Email Spear-Phishing Strategies |
| title_sort | game theoretical model for anticipating email spear phishing strategies |
| topic | attack game theory non-cooperative game email spear-phishing qre |
| url | https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.26-5-2020.166354 |
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