Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies
Autocracies have diverse records of economic growth. This paper provides a theory of endogenous coalition formation to explain economic performance in autocracy. The nature of the ruling coalition that the autocrat relies on to rule the society and extract rents affects the degree of inclusiveness o...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
KeAi Communications Co. Ltd.
2021-03-01
|
| Series: | China Economic Quarterly International |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666933120300022 |
| _version_ | 1797976422521765888 |
|---|---|
| author | Yang Yao |
| author_facet | Yang Yao |
| author_sort | Yang Yao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Autocracies have diverse records of economic growth. This paper provides a theory of endogenous coalition formation to explain economic performance in autocracy. The nature of the ruling coalition that the autocrat relies on to rule the society and extract rents affects the degree of inclusiveness of the autocracy's political and economic institutions that ultimately determines economic performance. A stable ruling coalition has to be invasion-proof --- i.e., being able to resist invasion from outside --- and coalition-proof --- i.e., being able to prevent split from inside. In a political environment where side payments are allowed to buy political support, a ruling coalition is coalition-proof if and only if it satisfies Condition E, i.e., every pair of its member groups holds similar levels of political power relative to the power of any third group (including the autocrat). When more pairs of groups satisfy Condition E in a society, the ultimate ruling coalition becomes more inclusive and societal output is increased. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T04:50:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-17829c1ca87b4c8ebae70bdc943a9268 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2666-9331 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T04:50:40Z |
| publishDate | 2021-03-01 |
| publisher | KeAi Communications Co. Ltd. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | China Economic Quarterly International |
| spelling | doaj.art-17829c1ca87b4c8ebae70bdc943a92682022-12-27T04:38:35ZengKeAi Communications Co. Ltd.China Economic Quarterly International2666-93312021-03-01117283Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocraciesYang Yao0National School of Development, Peking University, China Center for Economic Research, ChinaAutocracies have diverse records of economic growth. This paper provides a theory of endogenous coalition formation to explain economic performance in autocracy. The nature of the ruling coalition that the autocrat relies on to rule the society and extract rents affects the degree of inclusiveness of the autocracy's political and economic institutions that ultimately determines economic performance. A stable ruling coalition has to be invasion-proof --- i.e., being able to resist invasion from outside --- and coalition-proof --- i.e., being able to prevent split from inside. In a political environment where side payments are allowed to buy political support, a ruling coalition is coalition-proof if and only if it satisfies Condition E, i.e., every pair of its member groups holds similar levels of political power relative to the power of any third group (including the autocrat). When more pairs of groups satisfy Condition E in a society, the ultimate ruling coalition becomes more inclusive and societal output is increased.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666933120300022D4O4P5 |
| spellingShingle | Yang Yao Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies China Economic Quarterly International D4 O4 P5 |
| title | Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies |
| title_full | Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies |
| title_fullStr | Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies |
| title_short | Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies |
| title_sort | political equality coalition formation and economic performance in autocracies |
| topic | D4 O4 P5 |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666933120300022 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yangyao politicalequalitycoalitionformationandeconomicperformanceinautocracies |