An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option
This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improv...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2021-10-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/4/83 |
| _version_ | 1797504396574064640 |
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| author | Koffi Serge William Yao |
| author_facet | Koffi Serge William Yao |
| author_sort | Koffi Serge William Yao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T04:04:01Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-179e630700bb402d861de639a27a4bbe |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T04:04:01Z |
| publishDate | 2021-10-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-179e630700bb402d861de639a27a4bbe2023-11-23T08:26:42ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362021-10-011248310.3390/g12040083An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval OptionKoffi Serge William Yao0CEE-M, CNRS, INRAE, 34960 Montpellier, FranceThis paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/4/83laboratory group behaviorcommon pool resourceapproval mechanism |
| spellingShingle | Koffi Serge William Yao An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option Games laboratory group behavior common pool resource approval mechanism |
| title | An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option |
| title_full | An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option |
| title_fullStr | An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option |
| title_short | An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option |
| title_sort | experiment on cooperation in a cpr game with a disapproval option |
| topic | laboratory group behavior common pool resource approval mechanism |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/4/83 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT koffisergewilliamyao anexperimentoncooperationinacprgamewithadisapprovaloption AT koffisergewilliamyao experimentoncooperationinacprgamewithadisapprovaloption |